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Legal Aspects of the Security-Development Nexus:
International Administrative Law as a Check on the Use
of Development Assistance in the "War on Terror"
Graham Mayeda*
Abstract
When delivering internationaldevelopment assistance, states should not be able to place
the goal ofprotecting theircitiZensfrom transnationalterrorism above that of alleviatingpoverly
in developing countries. And yet this is precisely what they do on a regularbasis when they use
their polig on internationaldevelopment assistance to achieve security goals, as Canada, the
US, and the UK have done in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is bad development polig, it does
not increase the safety of those in developed states, and it is objectionable on politicaland moral
grounds.
This Article argues that internationaladministrative law can be used to challenge the
legitimag of using developmentpolig to achieve security aims. While many modern advocates of
the international administrative law paradigm restrict its application to the promotion of
proceduralnorms, thus making it difficult to review the discretionay decisions of government
poligmakers, nineteenth-century advocates of internationaladministrative law-for example,
Loren von Stein and Karl Neumeyer-were bolder. I develop their arguments in this Aricle,
demonstrating that in a globaligedworld, the impact ofgovernments' decisions on the welfare of
those in other states requires us to recogniZe a cosmopolitan legal order. This legal order
recogniZes that each individual on the globe has a right to self-actualization, which is a right to
have a say in decisions that affect her. The norm of equality inherent in a cosmopolitan
conception of internationallaw can have a direct effect on domestic law, limiting the ability of
poligmakers to make government policies that disregard the negative effects on the poor in
developing countries. The domestic courts in donor and recrjientcountries can be used to ensure
that harmful governmentpolicies are more consistent with the equality of all and the protection
of basic human nghts.
Graham Mayeda is an associate professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ottawa. He
was a Senior Hauser Global Research Fellow for the NYU Global Law School Program in Fall
2011. I would like to thank Kevin Davis, Donald McRae, Georgios Dimitropoulos, and the NYU
Hauser Global Research Fellows for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks are
also due to my able and enthusiastic research assistant, Martin Soudek.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A. Development Assistance-Waging War by Other Means?
The Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz once stated the realist
proposition that war is the pursuit of policy by other means.' The truth of this
position has become firmly entrenched in most views of international relations.
This Article aims to evaluate the contrary proposition-that policy is the pursuit
of war by other means. Today, the statement seems obvious when taken as a
matter of fact: Canada, the UK, and the US have concentrated their
development assistance in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan where they
presently have or have in the past had specific military engagements.
Development policy is thus being used as a tool to fight transnational violence
or to achieve broader security goals. But what of the moral and legal claims?
Should development assistance be used to wage war? Is it acceptable to use
programs to alleviate poverty for the sake of establishing the domestic security
of rich states? Does international law provide any answers to these questions?
In my view, not only is it an ineffective policy to use development
assistance as a means of ensuring domestic security, but there are legal limits on
a state's ability to do so. This Article explores one form of legal accountability
for states that exceed these limits: international administrative law. 2 Current
scholarship on international administrative law has largely focused on the
3
accountability of formal and informal transnational administrative institutions.
Moreover, scholars tend to advocate procedural norms of accountability and
transparency rather than exploring how international administrative law can be
used to restrict a sovereign state's discretionary policy decisions or impose
substantive normative limits on the exercise of this discretion.4 The current

1

Carl von Clausewitz, On War 87 (Princeton 1976) (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans).

2

I use the term "international administrative law" to refer to the general view that international law
has administrative law aspects. Later in the paper, I use the term "Global Administrative Law"
(GAL) to refer to scholars whose views on the topic were developed through association with
NYU's Global Administrative Law Project, and who, I believe, have a particular take on
international administrative law, as discussed in this paper. NYU's GAL Project is online at
http://www.iilj.org/GAL/ (visited Mar 27, 2012).

3

David Dyzenhaus, Accountability and the Concept of (Global) Administrative Law **2-3 (Institute for
International Law and justice (IILJ) Working Paper, NYU School of Law 2008).

4

Indeed, in a very thorough survey of the international administrative law regime of international
and transnational development institutions, Philipp Dann points out that while in domestic
administrative law the principles of equal treatment, protection of legitimate expectations, and
proportionality are central, in the law of international development, such norms do not exist.
Rather, the decisions of donor states are considered in some respects to be completely
discretionary. Philipp Dann, Grundfragen eines Entuicklungsverwaltungsrechts,in Christoph Mollers,
Andreas Vosskuhle, and Christian Walter, eds, Internationales Verwaltungsrecht: Eine Anayse anhand
Pon Referen.gebieten, 16Jus InternadionaleetEuropaeum 7, 47 (Mohr Siebeck 2007).
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international administrative law paradigm is thus inadequate for using
international human rights norms as the basis for reviewing administrative
decisions that have international effects.s
This concept of international administrative law does not reflect the
normative requirements of cosmopolitan justice, nor does it reflect the factual
situation of an increasingly interrelated, globalized world. I argue that this limited
concept of international administrative law must be expanded to encompass the
regulation of the administrative decisions of one state that affect people in other
states. The normative content of this form of regulation is provided by the
norms that underlie a cosmopolitan conception of international law, as well as
by the substantive legal obligations of states that make up international human
rights law. These norms are directly applicable through the domestic
administrative law of states, imposing on them an obligation to review the
discretionary decisions of government policymakers that violate them.
We can apply the concept of cosmopolitan international administrative law
that I will develop to address the use of development policy to wage a "war on
terror." Such application of cosmopolitanism should enable judicial review of a
policy decision of the government's executive branch to divert resources from
poverty-alleviation programs to programs that support military intervention in
developing countries where terrorist threats to the donor state exist. An
application for this kind of judicial review should be possible both in the
domestic courts of the donor state and the recipient state. The success of such
an application will depend on whether there are norms of international lawinternational human rights law or the norms of the cosmopolitan conception of
international justice that underlie international law-that can be applied to limit
executive discretion. This direct application of international law norms should be
possible regardless of whether a state has a monist system, in which international
law is directly incorporated as part of domestic law, or a dualist system, in which
international law norms must be incorporated into domestic law in order to have
legal effect.
B. International Administrative Law as a Check on the
Legitimacy of Domestic Policies with Transnational
Effects
We are coming to realize that people are bound closely together in this
globalized world.' The economic policies of Brazil, China, the EU, India, the US,

5

On this point, Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart point out that "in a
pluralist international society [such as exists today], in which human rights are not protected at all
or only minimally protected, the social basis for a global administrative law based on human rights
is largely absent." Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of
GlobalAdministraiveLaw, 68 L & Contemp Prob 15, 46 (2005).
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and other large economies have profound effects that transcend national
borders. Military intervention and international development aid likewise have a
significant impact on global stability and basic human rights. These effects have
led to dissatisfaction with the state as the basic unit of moral and legal
personality at the international level and to calls for greater accountability for the
effects of sovereign state actions on individuals in other states.' How can we
provide this kind of accountability? Traditional approaches to international law
have failed to do so. But international administrative law offers some hope. As I
will argue, the application of principles of administrative law to states'
international acts can respond to the increased demand for legal regulation
resulting from the web of globalization in which we are all enmeshed.
It is not obvious at first why administrative law is the solution. In common
law jurisdictions, administrative law operates within the division of powers, and
the role of administrative law is limited to the interpretation and application of
legal rules enacted by lawmakers to restrict the discretion of government and
administrative officials.' On this conception, lawmakers make law and judges
interpret and apply it;' there are no rules that courts may draw on beyond what
lawmakers provide. This paradigm is clearly of little assistance in the context of
development policy because, apart from a few limited examples,10 no statutes
exist to restrict administrative discretion in this area. The situation is worse at
the international level, where there exists no single, unified international
6

For an analysis of globalization as our experience of community with others, see generally
Graham Mayeda, Pushingthe Boundaries: Rethinking InternationalLaw in Light of Cosmopolitan Obligations
to Developing Countries, 47 Can YB Intl L 3 (2009). For a discussion of the global nature of the
social-economic-political system that affects all individuals, see generally David Held, Democracy
and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford 1995); Andrew
Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era
(South Carolina 1998).

7

On this point, see Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globaliation8-9 (Yale 2002).

8

Similar ideas exist in civil law jurisdictions, although additional organizational functions are
assigned to administrative law. German administrative lawyer Eberhard Schmidt-Aimann states
that the purpose of administrative law is both to restrict and to enable the conduct of
administration. For instance, he discusses in depth the development of administrative law as a
method for organizing state and social activities. He thus considers administrative law as
encompassing the "law of organizations" (Organisationsrecht), one of whose purposes is to structure
the conduct of work within administration as well as its decision-making process. Eberhard
Schmidt-Almann, Das Allgemeine Venvaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee: Grundlagen and Aufgaben der
verwaltungsrechtlichen Systembildung 239, 245 (Springer 2d ed 2004).

9

The quintessential view is that of A.V. Dicey. For a summary of Dicey's view, see P.P. Craig,
Administrative Law 4-7 (Sweet & Maxwell 4th ed 1999). For a nice encapsulation of the "formal"
account of administrative law, see David Dyzenhaus, The Deep Structure of Roncarelli v. Duplessis,
53 U New Brunswick LJ 111, 126-27 (2004).
See, for example, Canada's Official Development Assistance Accountability Act, 2008 SC, ch 17
(Can); the UK's International Development Act, 2002, ch 1; and the UK's International
Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act, 2006, ch 31.

10
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lawmaking body-only scattered ones that cover discrete areas of international
law. In consequence, there is little international administrative law to restrict the
exercise of discretionary decision-making power. Moreover, there are few
international administrative tribunals to regulate the relations of states the way
domestic administrative tribunals regulate the domestic affairs of a state's
citizens," and there is no general administrative law court to conduct
administrative review at the international level. 12
In contrast, David Dyzenhaus provides a different account. He argues that
administrative law is based on the fundamental norms that make up the rule of
law, many of which are embodied in the written and unwritten constitutions of
modern states, and on the foundational human rights documents of the
international legal order.13 On this view, administrative law is one of the means
to ensure that "fundamental legal values condition the exercise of political
power."14 Dyzenhaus questions the idea of administrative law based on the
division of powers as proposed by A.V. Dicey, in which the courts only review
the exercise of political power in cases where lawmakers have delegated them
that authority. Instead, he argues that the "constitutionalism" that exists in a
state governed by the rule of law "is . . . a project of achieving fundamental

values or principles, so that the separation of powers is useful only to the extent
that separation serves the project."15 In consequence, if we are to speak of the
existence of an international administrative law as opposed to a system of purely
politicalaccountability, there must be some fundamental norms that underlie the
law and that confer on it "some special legitimacy that transcends what is
ordinarily conveyed by the idiom of accountability."
We can apply the idea that fundamental norms legitimate the system of
domestic administrative law at the international level in order to provide the
accountability we seek for the decisions of sovereign states that affect individuals
in distant parts of the globe." Sovereign states do not act within an international
11
12

13

Some might consider bodies such as the World Trade Organization administrative tribunals with
transnational effects.
While there is no general administrative law court with the kind of jurisdiction of domestic
administrative law courts, smaller administrative tribunals with limited scope of review exist, for
instance at the World Bank, where the institution of the Inspection Panel serves as a control on
the discretion of the organization's administrators. See Dann, Grundfragen eines
Entwicklungsvenaltungsrechtsat 36-38 (cited in note 4).
David Dyzenhaus, Constitutingthe Rule ofLaw: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law, 27 Queen's
LJ 445, 488--90, 498, 503 (2002).

14
15

Id at 451. See also David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt, and Michael Taggart, The Priniple ofLegality in
Administrative Law: Internationalisationas Constitutionalisation,1 Oxford U Commw L J 5, 6 (2001).
Dyzenhaus, 27 Queen's L J at 451 (cited in note 13).

16

Dyzenhaus, Accountabikly and the Concept of (Global)Administrative Law at *4 (cited in note 3).

17

Dyzenhaus, Hunt, and Taggart, 1 Oxford U Commw LJ at 34 (cited in note 14).
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law devoid of basic norms except for those they create themselves through
treaties or through state practice that is animated by an intention to be legally
bound by this practice. Rather, as Dyzenhaus suggests, we can conceive of
international actors as acting within a system ruled by law that acknowledges that
the policies and acts of sovereign states must be compatible with the basic idea
of legality, which encompasses many international human rights norms and the
norms of sustainable development that elaborate this legality such as the
substantive equality of all states. Dyzenhaus's approach to international
administrative law is thus one way of enforcing these fundamental norms, and it
represents an effective legal framework that can be used to review decisions
about development aid.
I am not arguing that international administrative law constitutes a global
constitutional or fundamental law. Its role is more limited. As I conceive it here,
the existence of international administrative law reflects the basic idea that a
particular area of international relations (not international relations as a whole)
must be controlled by law. To put this another way, the fact that administrative
decisions with transnational effects "make law-like claims on those subject to
their power" means that these decisions are amenable to judicial review." The
evidence that decisions about development assistance make a claim to law-like
authority can be seen in the regularization of development assistance decisions
through formal and informal networks of national development agencies, the
participation of states in the creation of informal norms to direct government
aid policy such as those contained in the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness," and in the operation of national development agencies within
the scope of domestic administrative law regimes.
It follows from recognizing the need for law in a crowded world that one
of the tasks for this law must be to control the exercise of discretion of
governments that make policies-for instance, development policies-that
independently, or through coordination with other governments, affect the
human rights of those in other states. On this view, international administrative
law requires governments to demonstrate that a policy is justified in relation to
the interests of those it affects, that it was arrived at by means of a decisionmaking process that is transparent and intelligible, and that the decision is
rational and reasonably defensible in light of both the factual situation it is meant
to address and the norms of international law.20

18

19
20

Dyzenhaus, Accountability and the Concept of (Global)Administrative Law at *16 (cited in note 3).
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005), online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
15/3/46874580.pdf (visited Apr 2, 2012).
On the elements of judicial review of decisions taken by administrative decision -makers, see
Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190, f 47-50 (Can).

Summer 2012

77

ChicagoJournal of InternationalLaw

Of course, the scope of administrative law cannot be extended to
completely restrain political decision-making. 21 However, it should require that
government policymakers who wish to use development funding and programs
to promote domestic security and eradicate international terrorism provide
rational and cogent reasons for doing so. These reasons must be consistent with
the human rights and sustainable development norms that constitute the
framework for international development work. Moreover, they must take into
account the interests of those affected by the policy and provide a justification
for the policy that responds to these interests. 22
C. The Scope of the Problem-Conflating Development and
Security Policy
Over the last ten years or so, developed states have increasingly relied on
development assistance programs as a means of achieving security goals, such as
protecting their citizens from international terrorism. 23 The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) notes that developed
country spending on peace-building, security, and state-building has risen
tremendously since 2004, reaching US$ 7.1 billion in 2008. Likewise, official
development assistance devoted to security activities rose from US$ 947 million
in 2007 to US$ 1.5 billion in 2008.24 In a report on transition financing, the
OECD advocates increasing coordination of humanitarian, development, and
security funding.25
While the policy shift toward integrating development and military
programs is often couched in the language of policymakers and social scientists,
the motivation for this shift is often political. In his recent book, The Savage War:
The Untold Battles ofAfghanistan, respected Canadian journalist and award-winning

21

On this point, Dyzenhaus, Hunt, and Taggart point out that the role of administrative law is not
to substitute the court's view of the merits of the decision of a political decision-maker for the
latter's decision. Instead, the court is to require the decision-maker to provide reasons for the
exercise of the discretion. Dyzenhaus, Hunt, and Taggart, 1 Oxford U Commw LJ at 27 (cited in
note 14).

22

I will elaborate on the application of the administrative law paradigm in Section II.B.3.

23

For an excellent description of this integration, see Center for Human Rights and Global Justice,
A Decade Lost: Locating Gender in U.S. Counter-Terrorism13 (NYU School of Law 2011).
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance
Committee International Network on Conflict and Fragility, Summary Report: Ensuring Fragile States
Are Not Left Behind 11 (OECD 2009). For an overview of how OECD countries have diverted
funds from poverty-alleviation to security, see Jo Beall, Thomas Goodfellow, and James Putzel,
Introductory Article: On the Discourse of Terinsm, Security and Development, 18 J Intl Dev 51, 55-58
(2006).
OECD, Transition Financing: Building a Better Response 3 (OECD Booklet 2010), online at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/21/46338900.pdf (visited Apr 2, 2012). For the full report,
see OECD, Conflict and Fragility: Transition Financing:Builing a Better Response (OECD 2010).

24

25
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correspondent on Afghanistan, Murray Brewster, explains how the decision of
the Conservative government in Canada to shift gears from a purely military
campaign to one oriented toward development and humanitarian aid was driven
in large part by opinion research undertaken by the government. Brewster
explains the results of that research:
Most alarming to PMO [Prime Minister's Office] strategists was that
Afghanistan seemed to be a "no return issue." People who supported the
deployment were solid and mostly among the Conservative base. Those
who were against it were just as dogged in their view. The so-called soft
supporters worried the politicos the most; the numbers told them that when
these people decided to turn against the war, there was no coming back.26
Realizing the falling support for the Afghanistan campaign, a PMO staffer
explained the need to shift the public perception of the war:
One of the things that market research told us was that we were going to
bleed people over time.... We couldn't possibly hold the support for the
mission. So we had to change gears and that's when we tried to shift the
communications toward humanitarian and all that sort of stuff.27
What at first might appear a rational plan-to integrate development and
security programs-is frequently a purely political move to justify continued
intervention in a developing country.
There are three principal policy justifications given by donor countries for
merging development and security policies. First, poverty alleviation programs
must be delivered safely, and only military staff are trained to do so.28 Second,
poverty alleviation and the delivery of development programs is necessary in
order both to make residents of the developing country accept foreign
intervention2 9 and to ensure that the security that is achieved by means of this
26
27

28

29

Murray Brewster, The Savage War The Untold Battles ofAfghanistan 86 (Wiley 2011).
Id (quotation marks omitted).
In a comment addressing the costs of Canadian deployment in Afghanistan, Prime Minister
Stephen Harper stated, "When we have men and women in uniform, diplomats and development
workers who are putting their lives on the line, the government will spend what is necessary to
make sure they are safe and successful." Canada'sAfghan Mission Could Cost up to $18. 1B (Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation Oct 9, 2008), online at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/
2008/10/09/afghanistan-cost-report.htmI (visited Apr 2, 2012). RTI, a non-profit research
institute, summarized lessons learned from military-civilian cooperation in postwar Iraq,
explaining in its report how military personnel became increasingly involved in humanitarian
operations due to the instability and security concerns that existed after the collapse of Iraq's
government. Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Samuel Taddesse, Lessons Learned Brief No. 7: MilitaUCivilian Cooperation in Postwar Iraq: Expenence with Local Governance Reconstruction (RTI International
May 2005), online at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/pnadd574.pdf (visited Apr 2, 2012).
US Agency for International Development (USAID) and US Department of State (State Dept),
FY 2009 Foreign Operations Performance Report and FY 2011 Performance Plan 278 (USAID 2010)
("The United States is working to increase the capacity, skills, and abilities of host country
governments, as well as to strengthen their commitment to work with the U.S. Government to
combat terrorism."). Also, the stated goal of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) deployed in
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intervention outlasts the withdrawal of military personnel.3 0 Third, poverty
alleviation, to the extent that it creates stability in a fragile state, serves to protect
citizens of developed and developing countries alike."
The first justification is not at issue in this Article. Clearly, development
workers should not be put at risk in the delivery of development programs in
crisis zones and fragile states. However, this does not necessarily mean that
military or security personnel should control all aspects of a development
program. Indeed, as the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in
Afghanistan points out, it makes little sense to post development workers to
crisis zones such as Afghanistan if they cannot make regular contact with the
people they are intended to help.32
Of greater concern is the use of development programs for goals that
differ from the traditional purpose of development assistance, which is to
alleviate poverty,33 or the use of programs to alleviate poverty as a means of

30

Afghanistan and Iraq by NATO and the US government is to "win hearts and minds" of local
people. William Maley, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan-How They Arived and Where
They Are Going (NATO Review July 2007), online at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/
Military-civilian divide/Provincial ReconstructionTeamsAfghanistan/EN/index.htm
(visited
Mar 31, 2012); Ashley Jackson, Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of MilitariZed Aid in
Afghanistan **1-2 (Oxfam Intl 2010), online at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/
files/quick-impact-quick-collapse-jan-201 0.pdf (visited Mar 31, 2012) (paraphrased from a speech
given by Kai Eide, former UN Special Representative for Afghanistan, to the UN Security
Council). For a description of the "winning hearts and minds" strategy, see Mark Bradbury and
Michael Kleinman, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in
Kenya *4 (Feinstein International Center 2010), online at http://www.humansecuritygateway
.com/documents/FEINSTEIN_7 WinningHeartsAndMindsExaminingTheRelationshipBetween
AidAndSecurityInKenya.pdf (visited Mar 31, 2012). A useful description is also contained in Jude
Howell, The Global War on Terror,Development and Civil Society, 18 ] Intl Dev 121, 129 (2006).
US Dept of Defense, Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations 553.1, 4.2 (Nov 28, 2005). In a speech in 2010, US Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton explained the role of combined military and development work in
creating long-term stability:
The work of these development experts helps make future military action less
necessary. It is much cheaper to pay for development up front than to pay for
war over the long term. But in Afghanistan and elsewhere, U.S. troops are
helping to provide the security that allows development to take root.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, On Development in the 21" Century, Centerfor Global Development *6 (Jan 6,
2012), online at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/2009/Clinton/ 20Transcript2.pdf (visited Mar 31,
2012).

31
32

33

See, for example, USAID and State Dept, Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Peiformance Report 11 (USAID
2009).
John Manley, et al, Independent Panel on Canada'sFutureRole in Afghanistan, FinalReport *26 (Minister
of Public Works and Government Services 2008).
On poverty alleviation as the goal of development policy, see section III of the UN Millennium
Declaration, General Assembly Res No 55/2, UN Doc A/55/49 (2000). See also Beall,
Goodfellow, and Putzel, 18 J Intl Dev at 53 (cited in note 24).
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achieving the domestic security of developed countries such as Canada, the UK,
and the US. I turn now to a description of this use of development policy in
these countries.
A justification for using development programs to achieve these ulterior
goals is found in the UK's Strategy for Countering Terrorism, which states that "[i]n
fragile and failing states terrorist groups can obtain support by providing
essential services which can no longer be provided by government. Terrorist
groups can create a crude judicial structure where the law of the state has broken
down and cannot be applied."3 4 In consequence of this link between terrorism
and the lack of essential services, the UK Government explained the
Department for International Development's (DFID) approach:
DFID makes an important contribution to counter-terrorism objectives by
addressing longer term factors that can allow terrorist threats to develop in
fragile states. DFID programmes will help to increase the resilience of
communities to violent extremism, address the drivers of radicalisation and
develop the rule of law which is critical to [the UK Government's] effective
counter-terrorism effort."
In order to combat the tendency of terrorists to exploit poverty, the UK
government has committed to using 30 percent of its Official Development
Assistance (ODA) in "conflict-affected" and "fragile" states such as Pakistan,
Somalia, and Yemen, 6 which, in the government's assessment, are significant
sources of international terrorists. Furthermore, after a recent review of its
terrorism prevention strategy, Prevent, the UK has revised and relaunched the
program. It has three objectives: first, to "respond to the ideological challenge of
terrorism and the threat .

.

. from those who promote it"; second, to "prevent

people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given
appropriate advice and support"; and third, to "work with sectors and
institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which [the UK] need[s] to
address.""
To achieve these objectives, the Prevent initiative will in part rely on
international development assistance. The government justifies this reliance by
making the link between the achievement of development goals and the UK's
security goals:
The Department for International Development [DFID] also has a role to
play. Although its main purpose is to reduce poverty, overseas development
work in some areas can help to build resilience to terrorism through

34

UK Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terwrism 33 (The
Stationery Office 2011).

36

Id at 71.
Id. See also UK Government, Prevent Strategy 102 (The Stationery Office 2011).

37

UK Government, Prevent Strategy at 7 (cited in note 36).

3s
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programmes that strengthen governance and security, create jobs, and
provide basic services including education.38
Similarly, Canada spends significant amounts of ODA in areas such as
Afghanistan, where Canada's military is engaged. The justification for this shift
in ODA is articulated in the government's report to Parliament in 2007, in which
it stated that security is a precondition to economic and social development.39
Like the UK government, Canada clearly also justifies its new policy based on a
perceived link between security and development.
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) reports
spending CAD$ 344.7 million in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2007-08." In fiscal
year 2009-10, this amount had been reduced to CAD$ 238 million, although this
still made Afghanistan the second-largest recipient of CIDA aid.41 Of the
CAD$ 4.815 billion that the government of Canada spent on ODA in 2009-10,
CAD$ 53.52 million was disbursed by the Department of National Defence.4 2
The vast majority was spent on Canada's humanitarian effort in response to the
earthquake in Haiti. But CAD$ 13.126 million was spent on supporting a
provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan. 43 In its first report to Parliament
following the review of the Independent Panel, the Government of Canada
emphasized the need to coordinate diplomatic, development, and security
operations," thus closely linking the delivery of development aid to security.
More recently, CIDA stated in its Report on Plans and Prioritiesthat poverty
alleviation is a means to an end; that end is the "long-term security of
Canadians." The Report states:
Canada recognizes that achieving significant economic, social, democratic,
and environmental progress in the developing world will have a positive
impact on the prosperity and long-term security of Canadians, reduce

38

Id at 38.

39

Government of Canada, Canada'sMission in Afghanistan: Measuring Progress: Report to Parliament 3,
12-13 (Government of Canada 2007).
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada's Statistical Report on International
Assistance: Fiscal Year 2007-2008 5 (Government of Canada 2010). These figures are at odds with
those in the 2008 report, Independent Panelon Canada'sFuture Role in Afghanistan, which stated that
between 2002 and 2008, CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade had been
spending approximately CADS 100 million per year on Afghanistan. Manley, et al, Independent
Panel on Canada'sFuture Role in Afghanistan at 25 (cited in note 32).
CIDA, Development for Results 2009-2010: At the Heart of Canada's Efforts for a Better World 21
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(Government of Canada 2011).
Government of Canada, Report to Parliament on the Government of Canada's Official Development
Assistance 2 (Government of Canada 2010).
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of Canada 2008).
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poverty for billions of people in recipient countries, and contribute to a
better and safer world.4 5
This is a shift from the 2007 report to Parliament, noted above, in which
security was considered a pre-condition for development. The 2011 report
makes it clear that one of the goals of development is to benefit Canadians. The
report also states that the Canadian government will be spending 21 percent of
its 2011-12 budget on "fragile countries and crisis-affected communities," which
include Afghanistan.4 6
In the US, one can observe a similar subordination of development policy
to security concerns. Indeed, USAID is very clear that one of its goals is
achieving peace and security, not just for inhabitants of countries receiving aid,
but for "all people." It states:
The United States promotes peace, liberty, and prosperity for all people by
helping nations effectively establish the conditions and capacity for
achieving peace, security and stability. To address peace and security
concerns around the world, USAID, together with the Department of State,
directly confronts threats to national and international security by working
with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners. The five
priority program areas within this goal are Counterterrorism, Stabilization
Operations and Security Sector Reform, Counternarcotics, Transnational
Crime, and Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation. 47

President Barack Obama's most recent policy on the integration of aid and
security policy draws an even closer connection between these two concerns,
stating that "successful development is essential to advancing our national
security objectives."48
Moreover, President Obama has created a National Strategy for
Counterterrorism that integrates security and development. The policy states:
U.S. CT [counter-terrorismi efforts require a multidepartmental and
multinational effort that goes beyond traditional intelligence, military, and
law enforcement functions. We are engaged in a broad, sustained, and
integrated campaign that harnesses every tool of American power-military,
civilian, and the power of our values-together with the concerted efforts
of allies, partners, and multilateral institutions. These efforts must also be
complemented by broader capabilities, such as diplomacy, development,
strategic communications, and the power of the private sector. 4 9
In fiscal year 2008, USAID spent US$ 930 million, or 6.7 percent, of its budget
on achieving the goals of international peace and security, down from the

4s
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US$ 1.712 billion it spent the previous year. In its report for fiscal year 2009,
USAID and the Department of State had spent approximately US$ 9.6 billion
on its "Peace and Security" program, of which approximately US$ 225 million
was spent specifically on counterterrorism, US$ 411 million on combating
weapons of mass destruction, and approximately US$ 7 billion on "stabilization
operations and security sector reform."" In this last report, the US government
was even more clear that development aid can increase domestic security, stating
that "[i]t is a tenet of U.S. policy that the security of U.S. citizens at home and
abroad is best guaranteed when countries and societies are secure, free,
prosperous and at peace."5 1
USAID also explains that it relies on joint civilian-military operations, such
as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, in order to create the stability
necessary for future development.52 Moreover, in its 2009 fiscal report, USAID
and the Department of State emphasized that the "Just and Democratic
Governance" arm of their foreign aid program aims at contributing to US
national security-a priority placed above the achievement of the "broader
development agenda."" Indeed, there is increasing evidence that the US
government has come to depend on a close relationship between USAID and
the Department of Defense. In its policy document from September 2011,
USAID described this integration as follows:
USAID Missions have developed close relationships with DOD countrylevel counterparts to jointly plan and coordinate. In Afghanistan, joint
interventions have been effective when USAID is involved in pre-operation
planning for quick mobilization of development resources alongside military
operations. In many cases, coordinating while identifying distinct roles that
maximize interagency comparative advantages is key. Moreover, as USAID
builds up its learning capacity, our interagency partners will be significant
resources for lessons learned, which can continue to inform effective
integration, coordination and/or differentiation. 54
All three governments-those of Canada, the UK, and the US-have
gradually integrated their development assistance programs into their security
programs, thus consolidating what is frequently called the "3D" policy: the use
of development, defense, and diplomacy in order to combat national security
threats. The question is, is this a bad policy?
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D. Why Is the Conflation of Security and Development Policy
a Bad Idea?
1. Pragmatic concerns: an ineffective policy.
Two main pragmatic concerns arise in regard to the alignment of
development and security policies. First, can such an alignment lead to
successful development? And second, will it result in greater security for donor
countries? I will address each in turn.
a) Alignment of development and security undermines the achievement of development
goals. The alignment of development and security policies goes against the best
practices of development, for instance, as set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness.ss Among the key elements of the Paris Declaration are
"ownership" and "alignment." By promoting "ownership," the Declaration
advocates that "[p]artner countries exercise effective leadership over their
development policies, [sic] and strategies and co-ordinate development
actions."" The principle of "alignment" requires that "[d]onors base their
overall support on partner countries' national development strategies,
institutions and procedures." Few countries receiving aid would identify the
security of those in the donor country as a primary goal of their domestic
development policy. Tying development assistance to security interests thus
inherently conflicts with the principles of "ownership" and "alignment."
This conflict is borne out in recent reports following the Paris Declaration.
In Aid Effectiveness: A Progress Report on Implementing the Paris Declaration, a
document produced after a forum on aid effectiveness in Accra, Ghana in 2008,
participating states recognized somewhat euphemistically that "some progress is
being made towards fulfilling the Paris Declaration commitments on ownership,
but it is uneven among partners and donors."" The report goes on to say that
recipients of develo ment assistance have insufficient power to direct how this
assistance is used.5 To take a particular case, the Afghanistan Compact 0
represents an attempt to align developed country aid and intervention in
Afghanistan with local needs and priorities. However, there is as yet no formal
evaluation of its effectiveness in this regard. As the report on aid effectiveness
points out:
55
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56

Id at 3.

57

Id at 4.
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compact.pdf (visited Mar 30, 2012) (the Compact was the result of the London Conference on
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Many of the problems at the implementation level can be explained by a
series of tensions, dilemmas and trade-offs: there are trade-offs between the
Paris Declaration principles of ownership, alignment and harmonisation and
the urgent need for bilateral donors to demonstrate 'quick wins' in
supporting peace and recovery needs.... There are trade-offs between high
risk interventions (e.g. budget support) which, in certain circumstances,
could yield significant impact, and lower-risk interventions, which satisfy
fiduciary concerns, but which may bypass the state or damage local
.6 1
institution building ...
In short, current development practices in fragile states are in conflict with
overall best practices from a development perspective. Reading between the
lines of the report, it appears that security concerns often interfere with the
alignment of development programs with recipient country priorities and that in
consequence these programs are "owned" by developed country donors rather
than by developing country recipients.
Beyond soft law documents, recent social science research indicates that to
be effective, development work should focus on development-that is, on
building the capacity of the state to respond to the needs of its citizenS62
than on integrating development and military policies. For instance, Ashraf
Ghani and Clare Lockhart of the Institute for State Effectiveness argue that state
intervention in Afghanistan has in fact increased instability and damaged the
ability of the Afghan government to create stable economic, social, and political
development.6 3 In their view, a successful policy requires "the alignment of
internal and external stakeholders to the goals of a sovereign state through the
joint formulation, calibration of, and adherence to the rules of the game." 6 4
Social Development Directs suggests that international development aid can
61
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contribute to this process by helping to alleviate inequalities between groups
within the fragile state and facilitating a more equitable distribution of resources
across different groups."
Not only does military involvement disrupt development work, it is itself a
source of insecurity. Political science research demonstrates that insecurity
caused by foreign military intervention is a significant cause of poverty. As
Frances Stewart asserts, "[N]ational insecurity (invasion from outside, or a high
risk of it) can be an important source of such individual or community
insecurity, as the current Iraq situation demonstrates."" Such conflict destroys
all forms of capital, increases the share of government expenditure devoted to
the military, decreases overall government revenue, and negatively affects
economic growth and the provision of government services."
Not only does military intervention have a direct negative effect on
poverty, but it can also exacerbate the unequal distribution of political, social,
and economic resources within a state. This unequal distribution of the benefits
of poverty alleviation can be a further source of insecurity. Stewart demonstrates
that inequalities among groups within a state is one of the major contributors to
instability. 9 Where these inequalities manifest themselves in differential access to
political institutions, excluded groups may choose violence to compensate for
the inability to use political fora to rectify the imbalance.70 Foreign intervention
that targets particular groups within a developing country's population-for
instance, groups implicated in the incidences of international terrorism-will
inevitably increase these "horizontal" inequalities and bar access by certain
groups to peaceful means of resolving disputes.
Some argue that security is a necessary precondition to economic growth.7
Stewart also dispels this view. Her research indicates that the pursuit of security 72
and economic growth are not necessarily complementary goals if the benefits of
66
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economic growth are not equally distributed. She states that the "virtuous cycle
[between security and development] can .

..

readily be broken because it is easy

to have relatively high levels of security without necessarily experiencing
economic growth, or to have high levels of security and economic growth, but
not inclusive growth."" While it might be possible to promote both security and
development by ensuring the equal distribution of the benefits of development,
the fragmentation of society that results from foreign military intervention, like
the fragmentation that results from domestic wars, makes it difficult if not
impossible to address the horizontal inequalities that lead to conflict and violent
extremism.
Finally, prioritizing security over development can lead to short-sighted
development policy. Jo Beall, Thomas Goodfellow, and James Putzel point out
that a prioritization of security in development policy can create an incentive to
pursue visible goals with short-term returns at the expense of projects that
contribute to long-term development and, ultimately, security. They state,
A bridge in Baghdad .. .is both more visible and more 'relevant' to
enhancing global security in the current climate than inoculations in
Mozambique. Overall the swing is towards security as a priority over
development in the conventional sense, and the ironic danger here is that
failure to achieve significant longterm development can end up undermining
security anyway.75
In short, the short-term focus that military involvement lends to the delivery of
development assistance can have a negative impact on development, thus
militating against combining development and security policies that involve
military intervention.
b) The alignment of security and development policies does not increase the security of
donor counties. Part of the justification for unifying development and security
policy is that successful development projects will promote acceptance of
foreign military intervention in the host state. The continuation of intervention
that this acceptance makes possible will ultimately contribute to the national
security of the interveners. However, data have shown that the combination of
military and development policy has not won over the "hearts and minds" of
Afghans as intended. Roland Paris of the University of Ottawa submitted an
access to information request to the Canadian government and discovered that
by 2009, support for the Taliban among Afghans was at an all-time high7 1
despite ongoing military action and development projects to benefit Afghan
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citizens. Murray Brewster notes how the Canadian government has failed in this
regard in Afghanistan. He writes,
... almost everything we [Canadians] were doing for them [the Afghans]
was tailored to our tastes. In surveys stretching back to 2007, Afghans
clearly listed their biggest concerns as unemployment, an absence of stable
electricity and high prices.
'One half of Kandaharis view unemployment and electricity as the greatest
challenges in their community,' said the survey.
Yet what did we give them? Schools, polio vaccinations and the restoration
of agriculture through the Dahla dam project. Coincidentally, education and
health care are two gifts that Canadians hold close to their own hearts. The
issues were easily understandable by people back home and, most
importantly, politically sellable to a public that had already turned away from
the war in droves. Our solutions to the Afghan problem were elegant,
so ill-timed for a society in survival mode
thoughtful and well-crafted, but
17
want
to
weep.
that it made you
Ill-timed and ill-targeted, Canada's prioritization of development projects that
suit its own needs increases neither the security of Afghans nor that of
Canadians. Development that does not meet the needs of a community
ultimately threatens support for foreign intervention.
Development research demonstrates that the unequal distribution of global
resources is a significant cause of unrest. 8 Until these inequalities are addressed,
military intervention, even when combined with development aid, will remain
ineffective in achieving global security. Redressing these inequalities does not
require military intervention in developing countries. Instead, the solution lies in
part in developed countries' reviewing and revising their domestic policies that
promote instability. For instance, environmental policies that exacerbate or
neglect climate change may cause situations such as drought and famine in poor
79
countries that are beyond their ability to manage, hence resulting in violence.
Likewise, inequalities between states-for instance, in the distribution of natural
or financial resources-can foment unrest in poor states."0 Increasingly,
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developed countries are shifting their international development funding to
states that they believe pose security risks to them or that are potential allies in
the "war on terror."" For instance, under the government of Prime Minister
Stephen Harper, CIDA has cancelled many of its aid programs in order to focus
on twenty countries alone. This is a reduction from the 126 countries listed in
the 2007-08 Statistical Report on International Assistance.12 In the face of the
pervasiveness of poverty, this concentration, with a particular focus on countries
that pose security risks, will exacerbate rather than alleviate the unjust and
unequal distribution of financial resources that can cause conflict.
Despite the evidence that economic growth and poverty alleviation are not
necessarily correlated with the establishment of security, some still ask whether
security is not an essential good in itself that developed countries have an
obligation to promote in the countries they support through development aid.
However, accepting this view does not provide support for donor countries
defining the security goals of developing countries and setting up systems for
achieving them. Rather, it suggests a focus on the security needs of the recipient
state, rather than the subordination of that state's needs to those of the donor.
Some research suggests that the security goals of communities and states can be
better achieved by shifting from state-centered approaches to security to citizenand human-centered approaches." Those living in fragile or insecure states often
lose faith in the government's ability to provide for security. But a turn to
commercial, informal, and community forms of security provision can also be
problematic, leading to questions about the accountability of these forms of
provision and the interests that animate them.84 In their article, Alexandra Abello
Colak and Jenny Pearce advocate for the public provision of security, but "from
below." By departing from a state-based system, they mean that security ought
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Security 87, 87, 89-92 (2001). Note that the approach of Colak and Pearce differs from a
traditional human security model because it still sees a role for government in securing human
welfare.
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not necessarily be about the survival of the state.1 Their approach involves
"taking security out from the secrecy and closeness associated with intelligence,
military and defence circles," and it encourages a focus on "the protection and
welfare of individuals as the primary concern."" States and public institutions
would still be responsible for providing security, but security would be expanded
to include more holistic concepts of welfare." It would not necessarily involve
an authoritarian deployment of force," and the goals of the security enforcement
program would be informed by local communities' needs, rather than by the
eradication of rivals to the state or to those wielding political power." Colak and
Pearce recommend that "security from below" approaches should involve three
components: first, they should be informed by universal as well as local values
and be respectful of human rights; second, they should be agreed to by
community actors and be responsive to local needs; and third, they should not
create more fear or insecurity among populations.90
While these elements are more aspirational than practical, one can see that
this approach is compatible with the best practices currently advocated in the
development community, which emphasize ownership of development
initiatives by local beneficiaries and alignment of development goals with local
needs." On this model, security would be provided by the state-but it would
not be focused on state interests alone-and it would incorporate all aspects of
human security, from physical safety to meeting the basic elements of human
welfare such as food security, access to water and shelter, and so on.
c) The alignment of security and development polig indirectly affects remittances,
migration, and charitable donations to alleviate poverty in countries with laige Muslim
populations. The integration of development and security policy can have a
negative effect on development in other, more subtle ways. For instance, the
"war on terror," which is overwhelmingly identified with a war against Islam, 92
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has restricted the flow of migration and monetary remittances between
developed countries and developing countries with large Muslim populations.
Migration policies have a tremendous impact on the distribution of global
wealth. As John Page indicates:
Today international migration is one of the most important influences on
economic relations between developed and developing countries. It has
great potential for reducing poverty but, unlike trade and capital flows, it is
shaped more by the security policies of individual labour-importing
countries than by international regulations. 93
Some studies also indicate that remittance of income from those in
developed countries to those in developing countries has a significant impact on
poverty:
[Recent cross-country econometric work] also shows that international
remittances-defined as the share of officially recorded remittances in a
country's GDP-have a negative, statistically significant effect on the
incidence and severity of poverty as measured by the numbers of people
living below a poverty line, the poverty gap, and the squared poverty gap.
Counter-terrorism policies in Northern developed states have shaped the flow of
labor and migration between these countries and those with a large Islamic
population. As migration of those with an Islamic identity has slowed and
developed states impose greater controls on the flow of capital between them
and Islam-identified developing countries, there is a reduction in "both the
volume and the development impact of funds returning to migrants' countries of
origin."95 This is a political consequence of linking security and development
policy because it changes the identity politics of development by mapping
Islamic identity onto efforts to alleviate poverty; when the "war on terror" is
identified as a war on Islamic extremism, this reduces access of states with large
Muslim populations to the resources needed to reduce poverty.
Finally, Jude Howell points out that the alignment of security and
development policy is a consequence of the changing political significance of
civil society as a result of the declaration of the "war on terror."" Where
previously civil society had a benign meaning"-it was the patient on whom
development agents acted-since the declaration of the "war on terror" in 2001,
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civil society has come to be seen as potential hotbed of dissent and insecurity. In
turn, the discourse of "good governance," developed in the 1990s to create the
conditions of market liberalization, has also transformed into a tool for ensuring
control of this potential threat. As Howell explains,
Though the new wars of the 1990s had laid the seeds for a convergence of
security interests with development, the launch of the global war on terror
in 2001 generalised this trend beyond the narrow confines of postconflict
states to all aid-recipient countries. In this changed context the goals of
'good governance' and related ideas of civil society, human rights,
participation and the rule of law that came to prominence in the 1990s take
on a new meaning. In the 1990s they reflected the ideological victory of
liberal democracy and free markets over communism and an agenda that
positioned the domestic state as a key element in the pervasiveness of
poverty. At the turn of the millennium they become subsumed under a
much broader strategic canopy that is concerned with maintaining global
stability and preserving Western economic power. In this context civil
society has become a more suspect arena, one that may potentially harbour
enemies of Western interests and values as well as allies in the dual fight
against poverty and terror.
The characterization of civil society as a potential threat has had many
consequences, many of which are felt not only in developing countries but in
developed countries, where debates about the public display of religious
paraphernalia such as head scarves and the kirpan demonstrate the increasing
alignment of political issues in domestic civil society with international ones. Of
more direct relevance to development and poverty alleviation is the increased
scrutiny to which charitable organizations, foundations, and non-profit
organizations are submitted in donor countries." As Howell points out,
The specific targeting of Muslim organisations not only creates an unhealthy
construction of Islam as enjoying a special affinity with terrorism, a view
that defies all history of terrorism, but also identifies [the] Muslim
population as a 'dangerous other' that unless observed and disciplined risks
behaving in uncivil and violent ways. Apart from the alienating effects of
such a discourse, it also undermines the basic rights of Muslims to associate
and organise, as such action immediately draws suspicion. 100
Also, government aid agencies have begun scrutinizing their civil society
partners in developing countries."o' This can seriously undermine the ability of
these agencies to connect with community groups in a positive way due to their
perceived alignment with a foreign military,102 and it also impedes the alignment
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of development policy with local needs and priorities. Moreover, it places the
staff of civil society groups at risk of kidnapping or violence.103 1n conclusion,
Howell points out that "[w]hen governments portray essentially political
problems as cultural, social or economic, this reduces the discursive resources
available to groups seeking just political outcomes." 04
2. Political concerns.
I will address three political concerns. First, scholars have noted the
continuity of Cold War discourse with that of the new development-security
discourse. There are real consequences to this continuity that work to the
detriment of developing countries. Second, the merging of security and
development policy is often justified by the need to achieve "efficiencies" within
the bureaucratic structures of government. The search for efficiencies uses a
bureaucratic norm-efficiency-to disguise the political issues that arise from
the integration of development and security policy. Third, I briefly address the
capture of development discourse by political interests antithetical to
development.
First, from the point of view of discourse analysis, the discourse linking
sustainable development and security is a repetition of the discourse of the Cold
War. Beall and her coauthors make this point:
Through much of the 1950s and 1960s mainstream 'development work', as
propagated by the United States, took place largely within a security
paradigm. It took a long fight, via the movements for decolonisation in
Africa, the movement against the Vietnam War and the establishment of the
United Nations agencies, to achieve a separation of development assistance
from foreign policy concerns driven by security objectives and the trading
interests of the wealthy countries. 05
The legitimacy of development work since the 1960s has in large part
rested on the separation of the goals of poverty alleviation and the security of
developed countries, disconnecting development from Cold War conflicts and
recognizing the independence of former colonies from control by metropoles
and the axes of the Cold War."' However, the integration (or re-integration) of
development and security policies has the effect of re-politicizing poverty
alleviation, that is, of treating poverty alleviation as a means for securing the
North against the threat of terrorism. Poverty alleviation thus becomes once
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again a justification for metropolitan intervention and control in developing
countries.
The parallel between Cold War discourse and the discourse of security and
development has had the effect of legitimizing a new basis for intervention by
developed states in developing countries. Previously, the fight against
communism was considered a justification for American and European
intervention in former colonial states. As Mark Duffield has argued, the
emerging development-security discourse provides a new justification for this
intervention-the necessity of stabilizing states that are "at risk." Development
policy and direct military intervention are the two means for powerful states to
infiltrate the less powerful. Duffield argues that "[i]n privileging states to
prioritize the security of people, human security displays its credentials as a
biopolitical technology." 0 7 He goes on to explain how the current nexus of
security and development has shifted the justification of the intervention of rich
states in poor states:
Human security is but one indication that the state has once again reclaimed
the centre ground of development policy. This time, however, it is not a
modernizing or industrializing state concerned with reducing the wealth gap
between the developed and underdeveloped worlds, it is a postinterventionary human security state tasked with containing population and
reducing global circulation of non-insured peoples through promoting the
development technologies of self-reliance....
As a liberal technology of security, human security distinguishes between
effective and ineffective states in order to assert an interventionist
responsibility to protect. 1os
Duffield devotes a chapter to discussing how ineffective states had previously
been neglected during the 1990s, but through the new "biopolitical technology"
of the failed-state/insecurity nexus0o' have been the target of renewed interest
among policy-makers.no

Political concerns are not limited to the continuity between the discourse
of the Cold War and the discourse of security and development. The new mania
for efficiency and policy coherence among development agencies that is often
used to justify the integration of security and development policy hides the
political nature of this integration behind a veneer of bureaucratic logic."
107
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Behind the language of efficiency gains that are to be secured by such
cooperation is an intermixture of the varying political goals of these
departments, which are often at cross-purposes. For instance, increasing a
developing country's capacity to provide security may require greater state
intervention in civil society. In contrast, foreign trade and investment initiatives
may advocate less state involvement and a greater role for private ordering, for
example through the liberalization of the market for goods, services, and
finance. The commonsense notion of achieving efficiency through coordination
of various departments' activities in a developing country thus hides behind it a
host of political issues, that is, issues about the meaning and role of state
intervention, the level of acceptable foreign intervention in the developing
country, and so on.
Finally, in addition to a discourse analysis, political concerns also arise from
the increased possibility of "capture" 1 l 2 of development programs by the
domestic political players of donor nations when the ideals of neutrality and
impartiality of development assistance are displaced by the partiality of the high
politics of military policy. This capture and the manner in which it undermines
effective delivery of development programs is well-documented by the journalist
Murray Brewster. One example is the Canadian government's decision to
promote "signature" development projects in Kandahar as a means of selling the
Canadian public on an extension of Canada's military involvement in
Afghanistan. In 2007, John Manley, a former cabinet minister in the Liberal
government of Jean Chretien from 1998 to 2003, was appointed to lead the
Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. The Panel's 2008
report recommended highly visible development projects that would satisfy
Canadians that Canada's presence in Afghanistan was worthwhile.1 13 Brewster
explains the shock within the development community at the announcement
that the government would implement such projects:
The offbeat idea of putting a dedicated political stamp on Kandahar
reconstructions projects, for example, caused people in the development
community to light their hair on fire. So-called signature projects, the idea
of taking domestic credit for something as fundamentally altruistic as
rebuilding a shattered country, was an offence to their sensibilities. The
thought that the public needed to see something-anything-to justify the
Many policy documents call for increased cooperation among government departments. See, for
example, OECD, A Development Co-Operaion Lens on Terrism Prevention: Key Enty PointsforAcion
18 (OECD 2003).
112 In institutional economics, the notion of regulatory "capture" refers to the fact that public
officials will be influenced by rent-seekers (lobbyists) who advocate for their own private
interests. This "capture" can sometimes distort the resulting policy in favor of private interests
and away from public interests. The concept was first introduced by George J. Stigler in The Theog
ofEconomic Regulation, 2:1 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 3 (1971).
113 Brewster, The Savage War at 195 (cited in note 26).
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enormous expenditure of blood and treasure was so outside their realm of
comprehension that it might as well have come from another planet.'14
Brewster goes on to document critiques of the Panel's proposal by Canadian
development officials, who argued that this kind of capture of development
projects to obtain political support for military involvement is evidence of the
kind of paternalistic bias that the development community has sought to
supplant with ownership of development projects by communities in the
recipient state. Brewster quotes Graham Lowe, the former head of the UN
Habitat program in Afghanistan: "We go into development thinking we have all
the answers ... [But t]here is expertise in how to get things done and that
expertise comes from the locals. If you're smart, you tap into it.""s
The signature projects evidently did not correspond to local needs. Indeed,
a former civil servant in Canada's development agency who ran its programs in
Afghanistan pointed out that "Canada as a troop-contributing country should
never have focused its aid predominantly in the province that houses its
a strategy is vulnerable to criticism
[provincial reconstruction team].... Such
1
that aid is politicized and militarized." " The integration of development and
security can make development policy prone to capture by political interests that
can undermine development goals.
3. Philosophical concerns.
Leaving political discourse aside, the reasoning that justifies using
development policy as a tool for achieving the security of developed countries is
crassly consequentialist. It presupposes that the achievement of military goalsmany of which involve casualties to developed country forces and to civilians in
developing countries-is justified because of the ultimate goal of protecting
human rights once the military ends are achieved. Another way of understanding
this reasoning is that the human rights secured by poverty alleviation are not
important solely in themselves; rather, they are important as a means to
achieving the security of developed countries.
Consequentialist reasoning is not objectionable to all. However, the
particular consequentialism involved in justifying the use of development policy
to achieve the security of developed countries is objectionable because it uses
what utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer calls a 'partial' morality-a morality that
is partial to those who are part of our group, be it family, neighborhood, region,
or state." 7 It is a partial morality because it subordinates the interests of civilians
114
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killed by developed country militaries abroad and civilians suffering from the ills
associated with poverty to the protection of the citizens of rich states. Although
considered an extremist in terms of the extent of the obligations he thinks we
owe to others, Singer articulates an argument whose justice many recognize: We
have an obligation to help all humans regardless of their kinship to us and
regardless of the physical distance that separates us."' When used to evaluate the
conflation of security and development policy, Singer's view leads to the
conclusion that we cannot prioritize the security of our co-nationals over the
well-being of those in developing countries. Indeed, it follows from his
argument that we are required to reduce the costly precautions we take against
the relatively improbable harms of international terrorism in the face of the
more widespread harm of poverty and the damage caused by the security
measures developed countries currently promote to secure themselves against
international terrorism.
To depart from a utilitarian perspective and adopt a natural law approach,
combining security and development policy is based on a partial morality
because it justifies seeing the protection of the human rights of those in
developing countries not as an end in itself, but as a means of achieving the
rights of others. It is not normally acceptable to say that we work to alleviate
poverty in New York City in order to ensure that the rich are safer. Poverty is
alleviated because of the suffering it causes to the poor. Likewise, we cannot
treat the global poor as the means to achieving the well-being of the global rich.
Similar sentiments are expressed in PRT Coordination and Intervention in
Humanitaian Assistance,"' a policy note issued by the International Security
Assistance Force, the NATO-led security force in Afghanistan, which
specifically states that humanitarian assistance "must not be used for the
purpose of political gain, relationship building or 'winning hearts and minds' . . .
and must uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and
neutrality."' 20 Such condemnation of consequentialist views can be legitimately
carried over from the delivery of humanitarian aid to the delivery of
development aid, as both types of aid aim to redress threats to human security.

118 See Peter Singer's seminal article, Famine, Affluence, and Alorality, 1:3 Philosophy & Pub Aff 229

(1972). In this article, Singer argues that we must continue to give to others more in need until the
point of marginal utility is reached, in other words, the point where giving one more thing to
another creates more unhappiness than the happiness the receiving creates. The practical
consequence of this rule is that most of us in developed countries would have to give up most of
what we have to those who currently have nothing.
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Thomas Pogge adds to the picture of responsibility for international policy
the fact that some, if not all, international poverty is caused by the acts of rich
developed countries.12' He demonstrates that although we might not have the
positive duty Singer imposes on us to alleviate poverty in poor countries, we at
least have a duty to stop continuing or deepening the harm that the policies of
rich countries and the international institutions they dominate cause.122 The
financial crises over the past three years from 2008 to 2011 bear out Pogge's
assessment that rich countries directly harm economies worldwide, thereby
increasing poverty. As David Miller points out, when poverty is at least partly
the result of actions of developed countries-for instance, the result of military
occupation, as in Iraq and Afghanistan-those developed countries have a
responsibility to alleviate that poverty independent of the benefit that doing so
might bring them.'2 3 In Miller's view, this responsibility holds even if part (even
a large part) of the responsibility for poverty is that of the government of the
developing country state.' 24
4. Summarizing the negative effects of integrating development and
security.
To conclude this section, from a pragmatic point of view, the integration
of security and development policy in a way that subordinates development to
the security of the donor country is likely to be largely ineffective in achieving
development or security goals. Not only does such integration violate the best
practices of development, which require that developing countries set the goals
and priorities for development and participate fully in the delivery of these
programs, it also overlooks the underlying causes of violent extremism. This
extremism is exacerbated by foreign military intervention, especially when it
targets groups within a developing country who, as a result of this targeting, will
be marginalized and denied access to political voice. Moreover, allowing the
military to be heavily involved in delivering aid or establishing aid priorities
undermines the trust on which this aid is supposed to be based.
From a political point of view, the intertwining of development and
security policy has consequences for the distribution of political power. It
repeats the dynamic of the Cold War, in which developing countries were
dominated by powers seeking to establish international supremacy. The
discussion around efficient delivery through coordination of various
departments introduces the tensions between government intervention and nonintervention, public and private. Identified with Islam, the "war on terror" has
121 Thomas Pogge, World Povery and Human Rghts 14-20 (Polity 2002).
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resulted in greater marginalization of populations and racial identities associated
with Islam, both in rich countries and internationally. It also politicizes civil
society, making civil society groups and private actors subject to surveillance by
states that suspect their potential involvement in terrorism.
Finally, from a moral standpoint, the subordination of development policy
to security concerns is justified by an unacceptable partial consequentialism:
Countries are entitled to abuse the right to self-actualization of the poor in
developing countries in order to achieve greater security for their citizens at
home. Moreover, it violates the high value placed on human rights by natural
law theorists.
E. Alternatives to Aligning Security and Development Policy:
Citizen- and Human-Centered Approaches to Development
and Security
International documents such as the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness and current political science research indicate that integration of
security and development policies violates the best practices of development
work and contradicts recent research on the causes of conflict and instability in
military
foreign
conflict-especially
Military
countries.
developing
and
the
economic
by
destroying
instability
to
existing
intervention-contributes
social structures of a society. Moreover, such intervention frequently exacerbates
the unequal distribution of political, social, and economic resources in a state.
This horizontal inequality is a source of conflict.
But alternatives to these ineffective policies exist.
Some researchers and advocates are recommending a shift from statecentered security to citizen- and human-centered notions of security. These
concepts would recognize security as a community-based concept. Colak and
Pearce call this approach "security from below" and describe it as follows:
.'[S]ecurity from below' is about encouraging people to think about their
security as they do about their food, livelihood and human rights; it is of equal
importance."125 To prevent this community-based approach to security from
degenerating into warlordism, Colak and Pearce are clear that the state must be
involved in providing for basic security needs, stating, "Security provision must
be provided by public institutions, but it needs to be founded on agreed norms
and shared values. It also has to respond to contextualised needs in ways that are
legitimate and respectful of human rights."' 26 While domestic governments will
necessarily be involved in the realization of community goals, this involvement
should not give priority to the security goals of developed countries. To be
effective, bottom-up security measures must be developed locally.
125
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What is the role of the military in providing security on the ground? Mary
Kaldor, an advocate of human-security initiatives, suggests that the goal of
military intervention must shift from achieving the security goals of the
countries that are supporting military intervention to protecting local citizens.127
She states that when one adopts a human-security approach, the "primary goal
[of the military] is protecting citizens rather than defeating an adversary." 28
However, there is a danger in Kaldor's approach. I have already discussed
Duffield's analysis of the dangers of justifying state intervention in developing
countries on the basis of providing human security. He demonstrates how the
desire to regularize, organize, and coordinate the provision of development aid
through NGOs and civil society groups has hampered the ability of these groups
to help local communities. He documents a "repressive climate" that has "had a
negative impact on those NGOs working to empower civil society groups to
claim rights and express legitimate political concerns. 12 9 He goes on to argue that
"[a]n important consequence of governmentalization is that, from the
perspective of their prospective hosts and beneficiaries, NGOs are now
indistinguishable from the occupying forces with which they have often arrived
or on which they rely for protection."13 0
Given this analysis, the implementation of human- and communitycentered approaches to development must undo the close relationship between
the military and development agencies. Otherwise, a focus on community goals
and the security of the individual will be haunted by the specter that
development programs are primarily a means of achieving the geo-political goals
of developed states.13' Kaldor's view that the military can play an important role
in protecting the citizens of developing countries must be premised on the
possibility of separating the traditional military goals of protecting the home
state from the goals of promoting the security of those in the developing state.
Duffield's critique seems to indicate that such a separation is at best difficult to
achieve, or at worst, completely unachievable.
Finally, many critics of the increasing link between development and
security remind us that poverty is not in itself a cause of terrorism. The unequal
distribution of resources both within a state and between developed and
developing states are the principal source of global insecurity. If developed
countries were serious about increasing security and stability in developing
countries, they would examine how their domestic policies and the priority they
give these policies over the policy goals of citizens in the developing world
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contribute to the unequal distribution of global resources. Development
assistance must be directed to redress inequalities. Assistance that is not targeted
in this way or assistance directed at developed country priorities will remain
ineffective.
II. GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE SOLUTION?
Is it possible to bring decisions to conflate security and development
policies within the rubric of international administrative law? To answer this
question, it is first necessary to identify the nature of the government decision
we seek to challenge. Are we challenging the use of states' discretion under
international law to use force in self-defense or to intervene in other states to
protect international human rights? A policy decision of the executive to
prioritize security over poverty alleviation? A decision of the executive that
implements legitimate development policy? Or are we challenging governance
creep-the gradual encroachment of one area of governance (military/security)
on another?
Let us presume that the phenomenon we are challenging is a policy
decision to prioritize security over poverty alleviation, resulting in governance
creep-the infiltration of security goals and procedures into decision-making
around international development assistance. Is this an issue that can be
addressed by international administrative law? That is the question I seek to
answer in this part of the Article.
A. The Search for a Normative Basis for International
Administrative Law Review
In common law jurisdictions, administrative law is traditionally said to
function primarily within the framework of the separation of powers.13 2 In
consequence, a purely discretionary decision that is not made under the authority
of a statute is not reviewable.' 33 To allow such review would be to grant the
judiciary too much power over the executive. According to this view,
government decisions about the allocation of public resources or the exercise of
prerogatives are not reviewable unless they amount to policies that are abuses of
power or that involve a power that goes beyond the statutory authority of the
decision-making body. Therefore, in order to bring the policy decision to
132
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conflate military and development spending under the purview of administrative
law, one has to presume that there is a domestic law that confers the discretion
and hence creates boundaries for its exercise. This domestic law may or may not
be informed by international norms that apply within the state and that form the
legal framework within which a state exercises its powers.134 Traditionally, these
international legal norms had to be implemented by legislation. But more
recently, they have been given effect even where international treaties and
conventions have not been directly implemented, as long as the international
norms are useful in interpreting domestic law. Canadian law is an example of
this trend.'35 In the absence of such domestic laws, one might argue that the
discretion to make foreign policy cannot be reviewed based on principles of
administrative law.
However, alternatives exist to the traditional account of the scope of
administrative law. For instance, one could argue that there is a body of
international law that is analogous to the framework provided by domestic
constitutions and statutes, and that this framework is effective in national law
and limits the exercise of the legislative discretion of states. This is the argument
of David Schneiderman, who documents the emergence of global
constitutionalism, that is, the emergence of bodies of law that are quasiconstitutional, since they fetter the ability of sovereign states to exercise their
decision-making power.'36 An example of such a global constitutional framework
is international investment law. According to Schneiderman, the network of
international investment agreements limits the regulatory freedom of
governments, restricting their ability to legislate in ways that violate the rights of
foreign investors protected under these agreements.' 37 Applied to anti-terrorism
regimes, one could argue that the body of law emerging in the area of
international security is an example of the phenomenon of global
constitutionalism, and that the "constitutional" regime that this law represents is
the normative framework within which individual states must act. However, the
constitutional model is likely inapplicable to international security, as the regime
of law that governs it lacks many of the key institutional factors that characterize
the international investment regime, the most significant of which is that, unlike
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international investment, there are no treaties-bilateral or regional-that
directly restrict a government's ability to pursue its security by means of
development policy. The limited set of norms that deal with armed conflict and
foreign intervention are not a comprehensive set of constitutional norms that
significantly limit the normal process of government regulation of domestic
activity.
Another option is to determine whether some fundamental norms of
international law, such as international human rights norms, can be used
effectively to set limits on a state's anti-terrorism policy. If a donor country has
signed and ratified relevant international human rights treaties, then it could be
subject to the system for monitoring and enforcing these treaties. This engages
the system for applying and enforcing international human rights. I will not
describe the whole international human rights system for the enforcement of
treaty-protected rights. However, three main mechanisms would apply. One is
the employment of the system of state reporting, with its attendant observations
and recommendations by the UN Human Rights Council.'18 Second is the
system for individual or inter-state complaints and its attendant inquiry
procedure." 9 Finally, there is the possibility that the UN Human Rights Council
could appoint an international rapporteur for development, security, and human
rights."' This rapporteur would investigate whether international development
and security law and practices comply with international human rights norms.
However, as scholars studying the intersection of human rights and
development have pointed out, our international human rights regime places
more emphasis on civil and political rights than on the economic and social
rights that are more directly at issue in development.141 Moreover, the
development community has only recently begun to use the language of human
rights, which it has largely ignored up until now.'4 2 Also, there is as yet no
particularly effective method for enforcing international human rights norms.
For these reasons, the traditional human rights institutions may not be effective
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for policing the separation between development and security that I have
proposed.
The final option is to see overarching norms of international law as
emerging from non-traditional sources, not just from state practice and opinio
juris. I argued in my paper on cosmopolitanism in international law that a
phenomenological approach to international law would understand international
norms as emerging from the increasing experience of the inter-relationship
between states and individuals-in short, from the increasingly cosmopolitan
nature of international relations and the increasing access we as individuals have
to publicly available information about the suffering of others.143 These norms,
far from being a constitutional framework imposed on domestic law, would
instead be the normative framework within which domestic legal regimes exist
and from which they derive part of their legitimacy. I explore this latter option in
the following sections, first by describing the cosmopolitan norms that underlie
our experience of international community, and second, by demonstrating how
these norms can have direct effect in domestic law through the rule of law
enforced by domestic administrative law regimes. The interplay of cosmopolitan
norms and a domestic administrative law regime could be characterized as a
form of international administrative law.
B. The Phenomenon of International Law as a Source of
Cosmopolitan Norms
1. We do not need an international government to enforce
international administrative law.
Many political philosophers who advocate cosmopolitanism as the
normative basis of international law maintain that it requires the creation of
international institutions that essentially constitute a world government. Andrew
Linklater has argued that we should favor increasingly inclusive levels of
institutions such as the EU that will gradually encompass a greater portion of the
world's people.'" David Held advocates the creation of a Global Parliament, a
global legal system involving both criminal and civil law, and a system of global
accountability for economic agencies. 4 5

143

Graham Mayeda, Pushing the Boundaries: Rethinking InternadonalLaw in Lzght of Cosmopolitan Oblgations
to Developing Countries,47 Can YB Ind L 3, 53 (2009).

144

Andrew Linklater, Citigenshp and Sovereignty in the Post-WesphalianState, 2:1 EurJ of Intl Rel 77, 9599 (1996); Linldater, The Transformation of Political Communitjy at 7-8, 44-45, 193-204 (cited in note
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However, other philosophers throughout the ages have pointed out the
impossibility of achieving the sorts of institutions Held and Linklater envision,
among them, Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. In PerpetualPeace, Kant argues on
the one hand that a cosmopolitan approach to international law-one that
recognizes the equality of every human being and derives the norms of
international law from this fact-is a requirement of reason.' 6 However, he also
acknowledges that the international government that the actualization of such a
requirement of reason entails is neither possible nor desirable.147 Instead, he
recommends the creation of a peaceful federation of statesl48 with very limited
capacity to promote peace and to enforce the right of hospitality, which is the
right of any person to be received without hostility by another state.' 49
John Rawls, in The Law of Peoples, also rejects an extension of liberal
principles to the international level on the basis that an international legal
institution that could create and enforce international legal norms does not
currently exist and cannot exist.so
In my view, however, the objections of Kant and Rawls to an international
state do not preclude the existence of cosmopolitan obligations that we owe as
individuals to individuals in other states and that we must actualize through the
existing political and legal institution of the state, nor does it preclude the use of
national legal systems to enforce these obligations.
Are states free to reject cosmopolitanism as the normative basis of
international law? On a political level, there is no doubt that they are. But is this
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Kant's reasoning is that the concept of right requires the establishment of a peaceful means of
resolving disputes. In his view, the right to wage war is incompatible with the defense of universal
human rights, and so a federation of states is necessary in order to provide a peaceful mechanism
for resolving disputes between states or between nationals of two different states. Immanuel
Kant, Perpetual Peace: A PhilosophicalSketch, in H.S. Reiss, ed, Kant: Political Writings 93, 104-05
(Cambridge 2d ed 1991) (H.B. Nisbet, trans). See also id at 107-08, 112, 122.
For Kant, an international state (in other words, a supra-national state) is contradictory. However,
he is not especially clear about the reason for this belief. He seems to argue that, having already
formed states, which involves the subjection of the people to a legislator, the same people cannot
in turn subject themselves to a higher legislative power, as this would entail the dissolution of the
national state in favor of the international "state," and, therefore, be a violation of the national
state's sovereignty. Id at 102. From a practical point of view, Kant recognizes that we have not yet
reached the point where it is politically feasible to create such an international state. Id at 105.
Moreover, cultural and linguistic differences suggest that a single international state is impossible,
as unifying people with such differences is impractical and against human nature, although these
differences will tend to abate over time. Id at 114. Moreover, the larger and more impersonal the
government, the more unable it becomes to control its subjects. Id.
Id at 102, 104-05 and 127.
Id at 105-08.
For a discussion of Rawls on this point, see Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism,
Nationahsm and Patriotism 80 (Cambridge 2004). For an interesting critique of Rawls's The Law of
Peoples, see Pogge, World Povertj at 104-08 (cited in note 121).
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normatively justifiable? In Kant's view, reason dictates cosmopolitanism as the
normative foundation of international law.'5 ' Elsewhere, I have provided a
phenomenological argument that cosmopolitanism is a requirement of
international justice.152 By "phenomenological," I mean that one's experience of
community with others requires one to promote cosmopolitanism as the
normative foundation of international law. On this view, the phenomenon of
globalization-the fact of our experience of community with others, including
those in far distant places-dictates that we adopt norms that reflect this
community and acknowledge our responsibilities to those who live in different
states than our own. While the obligations to strangers are different than those
that we owe to our family members and those with whom we have close
emotional ties, in all cases we cannot ignore the poverty that we witness or our
part in causing it. However, for those who reject a phenomenological argument,
there is a rational theoretical justification for cosmopolitanism. As Dyzenhaus
has argued, it is part of the internal morality of law that those whose lives are
affected by a law should be given a justification for the effects that does not
resort merely to an assertion of authority.'5 3 The pre-condition of such a view is
the equality of those subject to the law, a basic norm underlying
cosmopolitanism.15 4
John Rawls has argued that it follows from a liberal's respect for
pluralism-that is, a respect for different views of what constitutes equality,
including views that subordinate women, religious minorities, etc.-that a liberal
state should tolerate illiberal states within certain limits.' 5 Thus, liberal
egalitarianism does not necessarily require a cosmopolitan conception of justice.
However, as Pogge and Kok-Chor Tan have demonstrated, Rawls was wrong on
this point. States that do not promote equality in their domestic law may
nonetheless support equality among states, with the result that the meaning of a
just distribution of the world's resources entails an equal distribution of them.5 6
Indeed, what illiberal state would submit to subordination in the international
legal order in order to justify its illiberal domestic regime? It follows from an
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As Tan points out, "[T]he ideal of impartiality is . .. central to the concept of justice, and any
plausible conception of justice must express this ideal in some appropriate way." This means that
a standard of international justice cannot demonstrate partiality to any particular nationality or
national interests. Such partiality would not be just. Kok-Chor Tan, justice Without Borders at 190
(cited in note 150).
155 John Rawls, The Law ofPeoples, in Stephen Shute and Susan L. Hurley, eds, On Human Rights 41, 80
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Kok-Chor Tan, Toleration, Diversity and GlobalJustice 169 (Pa St 2000). See also Thomas Pogge, An
EgalitaianLaw ofPeoples, 23:3 Philosophy & Pub Aff 195, 218 (1994).
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illiberal state's support for a principle of equality among states that we are not
justified in prioritizing the eradication of poverty in Canada, the UK, or the US
over eradicating it worldwide, as this would violate equality at the international
level. Moreover, Tan has argued that the toleration of illiberal states contradicts
the basic principles of Rawlsian liberalism by subordinating equality to
toleration. If Rawls accepts that we should tolerate illiberal concepts of
egalitarianism within an illiberal state, there is no reason why a reasonable person
within a liberal state should not likewise reject equality."' If a reasonable liberal
would tolerate illiberalism at the international level, there is no reason why it
should not be tolerated domestically. Thus, Rawls's law of peoples undermines
the whole normative foundation of A Theory offustice.
As can be seen, there are both rationalist (Kant) and phenomenological
(Mayeda) arguments as to why cosmopolitanism is necessary. Moreover, contra
Rawls, political liberals must also advocate cosmopolitanism or risk
contradiction in their advocacy of domestic liberalism.
In what follows, I explain which cosmopolitan norms apply to the use of
development policy to fight international terrorism, and I provide a short
explanation of the origin of these norms. I then explain how administrative law
principles apply to recognize and enforce them.
2. The applicable cosmopolitan norm: the right to self-actualization.
Cosmopolitanism presupposes the equality of all individuals. Some see this
as a consequence of the use of reason. Kant is the prime example of this view.'
However, alternative accounts of the philosophical basis of cosmopolitanism
exist. For instance, using the ethical and political philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas, I have argued that this equality is in fact something we experience when
we come face-to-face with the need of others; therefore, equality need not
presuppose human rationality or even the power to reason.' It follows from
any account of equality as a fundamental norm of international law that it is
imperative that law secure the preconditions for exercising our equality. As
Amartya Sen has ably demonstrated, the alleviation of poverty-the goal of
international development assistance-fulfills this imperative by securing the
conditions for the freedom of each individual to exercise his or her equality."'o
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Kant, PerpetualPeace at 108-14 (cited in note 146).
Mayeda, 47 Can YB Ind L at 10, 14-15 (cited in note 143). For Levinas's view, see his analysis of
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What are some of the subsidiary norms that are derived from equality and
that are instantiated in the provision of development assistance? In justice Beyond
Borders, Simon Caney identifies one of the principal aspects of cosmopolitanism's
recognition of the equality of all individuals, namely, that "persons have a
democratic right to be able to affect those aspects of the social-economicpolitical system in which they live that impact on their ability to exercise their
rights."16 ' This is essentially a norm of "self-actualization." Caney argues that it
follows from this claim that we must create international institutions to protect
and enforce this democratic right that is the manifestation of our equality with
others. 162 Be that as it may, the norm of self-actualization must at least
encompass what Arjun Sengupta considers the fundamental basis of the right to
development, namely, that the provision of development assistance must be
"participatory, accountable, and transparent with equity in decision-making and
sharing of the fruits or outcome of the process." 63 These norms are likewise
incorporated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 164 Indeed, the
requirement that development assistance be "owned" by the recipients and
"aligned" with their interests is essentially a restatement of Sengupta's point and
flows from the requirement of the recognition of the equality of all human
beings.
The norm of self-actualization is a relatively minimalist requirement, but it
can do a significant amount of work when it comes to restraining development
programs that subordinate the needs of developing countries to the security
interests of developed ones. Self-actualization requires that those affected by a
decision of a donor state participate in the decision. It also requires that donors
be accountable to recipients for their policies and transparent in their
formulation and implementation of them. As I will show, while they do not
preclude combining development and security goals in a government policy, the
normative content of self-actualization forbids the subordination of
public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states." Amartya Sen,
Development as Freedom 3 (Anchor 1999). Implicit in this articulation of the goal of development as
the expansion of agency is the equal value of every agent.
161 Caney,Justie Beyond Borders at 158 (cited in note 145).
Id at 159, 182. Caney is of the view that these international institutions must reflect three values:
the protection of civil and political human rights and the promotion of cosmopolitan distributive
principles, the protection of people's ability to affirm their cultural and national commitments,
and the accountability of institutions and agents where the actions of the latter affect the exercise
of people's rights. Id.
163 Arjun Sengupta, Right to Development, UN Doc A/55/306, 21-22 (2000). For an elaboration on this
statement, see Uvin, Human Rights and Development at 138 (cited in note 138). Grainne de Buirca
also points to the importance of "the fullest possiblepanidpation and representation of those affected' in
decisions of transnational bodies. Grainne de Brirca, Developing Democray Beyond the State, 46 Colum
J Transnad L 101, 107 (2008).
162
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development to security. The development goals of the recipient country must
be given at least equal priority, and they cannot merely be the side effect of
pursuing security goals. Moreover, the requirement of equality is violated if
individuals in a developing country are used as a means of securing the interests
of those in the developed world.
How can this foundational norm of a cosmopolitan international legal
order-equality-be used to limit the discretion of donor governments to
pursue security through development policy? Through the observation that
securing this fundamental norm, articulated as the right to self-actualization and
the demand for transparency, accountability, and participation, is likewise the
goal of administrative law. Indeed, as Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and
Richard B. Stewart point out, these procedural norms form the background of
global administrative law.16 ' Although these norms may not completely prevent
the integration of security and development policy, to the degree that norms of
participation, accountability, and transparency are largely absent in the security
policy of states, the requirement that development programs conform to them is
an effective normative basis for limiting such integration.
In the next section, I discuss how the norm of self-actualization, which is
derived from the fundamental norm of equality that underlies a cosmopolitan
legal order, can be implemented through global administrative law. I argue that it
follows from my adoption of Dyzenhaus's conception of administrative law that
the legitimacy of administrative law review does not depend on the existence of
a statute setting out the norms against which government funding decisions
about development assistance will be evaluated; that is, administrative law does
not function purely within the division of powers, and consequently,
administrative law review is not dependent on the legislative branch's granting
tribunals the power to review a statutorily conferred administrative discretion."
Instead, as Dyzenhaus argues, certain human rights norms themselves provide
the normative basis for administrative law review, and they can be directly
applied in such a review without being incorporated into domestic law by the
enactment of a statute. Indeed, the basic norm that underlies rights-based
cosmopolitanism-the norm of self-actualization-is precisely the kind of norm
that can be directly applied in administrative law review of government decisionmaking relating to development assistance. I turn now to the justification for this
"globalist" interpretation of administrative law.
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Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 68 L & Contemp Prob at 37-41 (cited in note 5).
For the contrary view in UK law, see Regina (Alconbury Developments Ltd and others) v Secretary of State
for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] 2 AC 295 (UK), where the law lords emphasize
the importance of complex political decisions affecting diverse constituencies being matters that
are best left to the executive rather than the judiciary. For a good interpretation of this case, see
Adam Tomkins, The Struggle to Delimit Executive Powerin Britain, in Craig and Tomkins, The Executive
and Publc Law 16, 27-30 (cited in note 132).
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3. Applying the foundational norms of cosmopolitanism in domestic
courts.
My contention that there is recourse for decisions of sovereign
governments relating to development assistance suggests an international
dimension to administrative law. International administrative law has a long
history in Europe, where it goes back to the work of Lorenz von Stein in the late
nineteenth century"' and Karl Neumeyer in the first few decades of the
twentieth."' The international administrative law paradigm has found renewed
vigor in modern legal circles such as Global Administrative Law (GAL). As
Kingsbury explains, a "global administrative space" has emerged that challenges
the traditional characterization of international law as the law governing
interactions between sovereign governments."' While international law has
historically separated the domestic and the international, the internal and the
external, the new global administrative law paradigm sees continuity between the
two.'70 Kingsbury notes:
This global administrative space is increasingly occupied by transnational
private regulators, hybrid bodies such as public-private partnerships
involving states or inter-state organizations, national public regulators
whose actions have external effects but may not be controlled by the central
executive authority, informal inter-states bodies with no treaty basis
(including 'coalitions of the willing'), and formal interstate institutions (such
as those of the United Nations) affecting third parties through
administrative-type actions.1
According to this paradigm, national courts can be called upon to police
domestic institutions that are involved in administering a decentralized system of
global governance. The system of international development assistance could be
considered just such a system. The network of national aid agencies, of which
CIDA, DFID, and USAID are just a few, basically administer our main system
for alleviating poverty in other countries. They clearly have the transnational and
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See Lorenz von Stein, Einzge Bemerkungen iber das internationale Venvaltungsrecht, in Gustav
Schmoller, ed, 6 Jahrbuch fir Geset-gebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich 1
(Duncker & Humblot 1882).
Karl Neumeyer, Internationales Venvaltungsrech: Vlkerrechtliche Grundlagen, in Karl Strupp, ed, 1
Wbrterbuch des Volkerrechts and der Diplomatie 577 (de Gruyter 1924).
Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Law' in Global Administrative Law *2 (IILJ Working Paper,
2009
NYU School of Law 2009), online at http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/
Introduction:
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and
Benedict
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31,
2012);
Mar
(visited
1.GAL.Kingsbury.pdf
Global Governance and GlobalAdministrativeLaw in the InternationalLegal Order, 17:1 Eur J Intl L 1, 1,
10-11 (2006); Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 68 L & Contemp Prob at 18 (cited in note 5).
Krisch and Kingsbury, 17:1 Eur J Intl L at 11 (cited in note 169).

171 Kingsbury, The Concept of Law'at *2 (cited in note 169).
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global impact that would bring them under the global administrative law
paradigm that its advocates envision." 2
However, is bringing domestic institutions involved in a decentralized
system of global governance within the purview of international administrative
law sufficient to reach the discretionary decisions of policymakers to integrate
development and security policy? It appears not. The main advocates of GAL
consider international administrative law to be primarily concerned with the
decisions of intergovernmental organizations and more formal transnational
networks of national regulatory officials."1 3 The decisions of sovereign
governments that affect those in other states do not generally fall within the
paradigm, although Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart acknowledge that
"regulatory decisions by a domestic authority [that] adversely affect other states,
designated categories of individuals, or organizations" could be challenged if
they are "contrary to that government's obligations under an international
regime to which it is party.""' There is thus some room here for review of policy
decisions that are contrary to a state's international legal obligations. However,
to date, the kind of administrative action that GAL scholars consider to be
reviewable is generally confined to the decisions of regulators and administrative
tribunals involved in "rulemaking, administrative adjudication between
competing interests, and other forms of regulatory and administrative decision
and management."" Discretionary policy decisions do not fall within this
category of "administrative action."17 1
However, in my view, administrative law should extend to certain
discretionary policy decisions of government."' Kingsbury indicates that GAL
should apply to decisions coordinated among various states' governments. 178
Development policy, with or without security implications, has precisely the kind
of transnational or global impact necessary to take it outside of the sole purview
172

For a good description of the transnational nature of international development and its
administrative law aspects, see generally Dann, Grundfragen eines Entwicklungsvenraltungsrechts(cited
in note 4).
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Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 68 L & Contemp Prob at 16, 20, 25 (cited in note 5).
Id at 16.
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Id at 17.
The kind of review I am suggesting also does not figure in Kingsbury's summary of the forms of
review possible under global administrative law. See Kingsbury, The Concept of Law' at **23--30
(cited in note 169).
177 To be clear, only specific instances or applications of the policy, and not the policy itself, can be
reviewed. On this point, see Tomkins, The Struggle to Delimit Executive Power in Britain at 47 (cited in
note 166) ("It is important to remember the particularity of judicial review as a mechanism of
executive accountability. The courts can never (and nor should they be able to) review
government policy as such.").
175
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space includes "informal inter-state bodies with no treaty basis." Id.
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of the discretionary decision-making power of national governments.'79
Moreover, there are international legal norms that can be applied to review these
decisions. These include norms that traditionally form part of the administrative
law toolbox such as participation, accountability, and transparency, as well as
basic human rights norms such as the norm of self-actualization that forms the
basis of development policy, which aims to expand the ability of individuals to
lead the kinds of lives they wish to live by alleviating the poverty that stands in
the way of their doing so.
As I explained earlier in this paper, Dyzenhaus has argued that substantive,
rather than merely procedural, norms must underlie the rule of law, of which
administrative law is one of the chief enforcement branches." For Dyzenhaus,
these minimal substantive norms form part of the normative framework that
undergirds the relations between states, for instance, the protection of basic
human rights. While other scholars admit that human rights norms form part of
the normative framework of GAL, they tend to see these as applying only to
restrict the actions of administrative and regulatory decision-makers rather than
policymakersi' 8 However, even if one is to deny the direct application of human
rights norms in domestic administrative law review, the traditional norms of
administrative law also serve to protect "the rights of individuals and other civil
society actors,"'8 2 thus conferring on these actors a right to challenge
discretionary decisions of the executive that have a direct impact on them.'8 3 At
a minimum, then, individuals should have a right to participate in making
decisions that directly affect them and their ability to pursue their goals and
projects that they have good reason to pursue. 18 4 It follows from this that they
should have the ability to challenge the conflation of development and security
policy to the degree that it impedes their capacity for self-actualization.
However, there may not be a need to resort to the norms underlying the
international rule of law. For some European administrative law experts,
administrative law extends beyond the conferring of executive discretion on

1'

See generally Dann, Grundfragen eines Eniwicklungsvenvaltungsrechts (cited in note 4).

18s

See notes 13-17 and accompanying text. Many scholars of administrative law are of the view that
it is in fact the principal means of limiting executive power. Paul Craig and Adam Tomkins,
Introduction, in Craig and Tomkins, eds, The Executive and PubficLaw 1, 11 (cited in note 132).

181 See, for example, Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 68 L & Contemp Prob at 29 (cited in note 5).
182

Id at 43.
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Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart limit the kind of review available to an individual directly affected
by administrative action to a review based on due process rights. Id at 46.

184

Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart admit the possibility of review of administrative decisions that
deny a right to participate. However, they doubt whether this possibility would achieve wide
international support given the ongoing challenges to democratic principles in some countries.
Also, they limit the application of democratic principles to the making of administrative decisions,
and do not discuss the making of discretionary decisions by the executive. Id at 48-49.
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administrators and administrative bodies by legislators. For them, even the
administrative framework within which the decisions of government and of
inter-governmental organizations are implemented can itself have the
characteristics of law. On this view, the norm of self-actualization contained in
development concepts such as the recipient's "ownership" of development aid
programs may go beyond being simply good development policy. Instead, it may
have a legal character, thus obviating the need to resort to deriving selfactualization as a foundational norm of a cosmopolitan conception of
international law. For instance, Philipp Dann has argued that documents such as
the Paris Declaration are not merely hortatory-they have legal characteristics.
The administrative guidelines and the policy plans developed by international
organizations that deliver aid, such as the World Bank and the UN Development
Programme, are forms of administrative law that are well-known in domestic
administrative law regimes.' 5 Parts of both the Paris Declaration and the
Millennium Development Goals"' contain quantified goals for development
cooperation. Among these goals is a commitment to increase the ownership of
recipient countries over development projects.'8 ' The coercive nature of the
policy goals contained in these documents indicates their legal character.'
Indeed, Dann examines the enforcement mechanisms that can be used to obtain
compliance with the policy goals, stating that the legal department of the World
Bank constitutes a form of administrative regulator that can obtain compliance
with the policy documents produced by the international development regime.'
Part of the enforcement mechanism relies on interpretations of the legal nature
of obligations undertaken by states. But part also rests on the power of these
legal officers to approve the international legal contracts by means of which
official development assistance is distributed to recipient states. 9 0
Regardless of its source as a fundamental norm of international law or as a
norm of the administrative law of development cooperation, the norm of selfactualization should be enforceable in two ways: first, through administrative
review of discretionary government decisions affecting international human
rights in the domestic courts of countries providing development assistance; and
second, through administrative review of the regulatory actions of countries
providing development assistance in the domestic courts of the state receiving
185 Dann, Grundfrageneines Encklungsvernaltungsrechts at 33, 36 (cited in note 4).
186
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UN Millennium Declaration, General Assembly Res No 55/2, UN Doc A/55/49 (cited in note
33).
Dann, Grundfragen eines Entricklungsverwa/tungsrechtsat 35 (cited in note 4). Goal 8 of the MDGs is
to "develop a global partnership for development." See UN Millennium Declaration, General
Assembly Res No 55/2, UN Doc A/55/49 (cited in note 33).
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this assistance."' I leave aside for the moment the difficulties of standing and
forum non conveniens that might pose a barrier to such forms of review.
The argument that a discretionary government decision in regard to
security and development policy should be subject to administrative law review
by a domestic court is consistent with the views of early advocates of
international administrative law. Stein, often considered the founder of
international administrative law, explains that this form of law deals with
elements of domestic law that affect the administration of law in other states. He
explains that international law is the manifestation of the communal life of
individuals that transcends national boundaries.192 It is precisely through the
attempts of individual states to differentiate themselves from others that
international law arises, and yet this process of differentiation-an expression of
state sovereignty-is likewise an expression or crystallization of a communal
international life." 3 From this early recognition of what we today call
"globalization," Stein demonstrates that it follows that there must be a body of
international administrative law that encompasses the aspects of a state's
domestic law that respond to the legal decisions of other states. He says,
The violence which the nature and degree of the intercourse between
European states exercises on each of them individually, often without the
states having taken account of it, gives rise to an international element in
their own [domestic] legal order. And it is precisely within domestic
administration that, without a [specific] agreement [between states], there
arises that which we call, in its narrower sense, international administrative
law-the taking up in domestic administrative law of regulations relating to

international relations that are then incorporated into the state's own
19 4
administrative law.

In recognizing the porosity of domestic legal regimes, Stein accepts that
international law, which is the manifestation of the relations between states, has

191 On the challenges of using domestic courts in this way, see Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 68 L
& Contemp Prob at 30-31, 50 (cited in note 5).
192
Von Stein, Einige Bemerkungen iber das internationale Venvaltungsrecht at 26-29 (cited in note 167). For
an explanation of Stein's notion that the life of the individual is in part realized through
participating in the shared life of the international community, see Christian Tietje,
InternaionalisiertesVerwaltungshandeln 58-60 (Duncker & Humblot 2001).
193
Von Stein, Einige Bemerkungen fiber das internationale Venaltungsrecht at 29-30 (cited in note 167).
194

Id at 43. Bodo Richter interprets Stein as I do-as proposing that three kinds of legal rules form
part of international administrative law: 1) rules created by purely international organizations, 2)
rules contained in international contracts and agreements that have administrative content, and 3)
rules that promote and support the relations between private and social groups that cross state
borders, regardless of whether these norms are of national or international provenance. Bodo
Richter, Volkerrecht, Aufsenpolitk und internationalVenvaltung bei Loreni von Stein 237-38 (Heitmann
1973). Richter cites Georg Erler, who argues that Stein's vision also applies in the modern world.
Georg Erler, Grnndprobleme des Internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts 1-18 (Schwartz 1956).
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direct legal effect in domestic legal regimes.' It is only one step further to
recognize that we are not dealing with a one-way street. To the extent that
international administrative law arises from the domestic legal responses to
interactions between one state and another, it must also give rise to mechanisms
for checking domestic policies and administrative decisions that affect those in
other states. Otherwise, these purely domestic decisions would not contribute to
the elaboration of an international communal life, but rather, would constantly
detract from them. In concrete terms, development policies that affect not only
those in other states but the stability of the global community must be able to be
monitored through domestic administrative law.
Following Stein, Karl Neumeyer maintained that international
administrative law (Internationales Venvaltungsrech) deals with the relationship

between administrative agencies (Vewaltungen) of two or more states."' In his
view, the activities of one administrative agency (for instance, CIDA) that reach
into another country (for instance, Afghanistan) and interact with the bodies that
administer development programs in that country (poverty-alleviation programs
of various sorts in Afghanistan) must be subject to international law
(Vlkerrech):'97
The idea of the possibility and even the necessity of seeking boundaries for
the operation of [an administrative body of one state in another state] is
rooted in the reciprocal recognition of the respective societies
[Gemeinschaften]. And when the recognition of the autonomous
administrative bodies [Verbdnde] within a state is facilitated by the host
[ilbergeordne] state, it is international [administrative] law [Vilkerrech] that

makes this possible. It follows from this that [the foreign administrative
agency] has a legal obligation in international law [Volkerrecht not to act
illeally within the purview of the administrative responsibilities granted to
it.

It follows from Neumeyer's argument that when an administrative body of State
A operates in State B, its policy decisions are subject to international
administrative law. This holds even if these decisions affect only inhabitants of
State B.
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For a good theoretical elaboration of this point, see Tietje, IntenaionaisiertesVervaltunghandeln at
62-63 (cited in note 192).
Neurneyer, Intemalionales Verwaltungsrecbt: VoIkerechthiche Grundlagen at 577-81 (cited in note 168).
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Friedrich von Martens held a similar view: The decisions of domestic administrative bodies that
affect international cooperation and other states fall within the realm of international
administrative law. Friedrick von Martens, 2 Vdlkerrecht: Das Internaionale Recht der Civilisirten
Nationen 6 (Weidmann 1886). Tietje discusses von Martens's view in Internaionalisiertes
Verwaltungshandeln at 69 (cited in note 192).
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One might be tempted to restrict the views of Neumeyer and Stein to
monist civil law systems in which international law has direct application.' 9
However, this restricted reading is unwarranted. First, scholars have noted the
erosion of dualism in common law systems.200 John T. Parry and Melissa A.
Waters document common law judges' increasing reliance on international
human rights law as the source of and basic interpretational tool for domestic
human rights law.20' Second, the norms of equality and self-actualization that I
have sought to have enforced through domestic courts are part of the very
notion of international legality itself. While a court in a dualist state might be in
some doubt as to the meaning and application of a particular provision in an
international treaty, these courts cannot be in doubt about the application of
norms that form the very basis of a cosmopolitan international law regime.
Dualist states do not challenge the idea that they are bound to respect their
international legal obligations. They may differ from monist states in the way
that these legal obligations are given effect in domestic law. But to the degree
that they acknowledge international law as a source of binding norms, they
accept-and can give direct effect to-the norms that give meaning to the rule
of international law.
Another objection to my argument that the security of the state cannot
trump cosmopolitan obligations is that a decision about national security is
precisely the kind of decision that affects the survival of the state, without which
cosmopolitan obligations cannot be observed at all. At the international level,
for instance, the Security Council sets out only "minimal standards for
participation, reason-giving, and review" in security matters, eschewing more
substantive ones.202 However, as Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart point out, such
199

200

201

202

A typical expression of such monism from a civil law perspective is contained in Art 25 of
Germany's Basic Law (Grundgesetz fir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland), which states, "The
general rules of international law are part of German national law. They take precedence over
domestic law and give rise to rights and duties for residents of the German state." Tietje explains
that both the flexibility and openness of this article of the basic law necessarily requires the
rejection of the categories of monism and dualism. Tietje, InternaionakisiertesVeraltunghandeln at
567-68 (cited in note 192).
Tietje notes the artificial nature of the debate between monism and dualism, which, he says, must
be understood in the particular historical-legal context in which the debate emerged. Id at 566.
Melissa A. Waters, CreepingMonism: TheJudidal Trend Toward Intepredve IncorporaionofHuman Rehts
Treaies, 107 Colum L Rev 628, 651 (2007). In regard to treaties, see John T. Parry, Congress, the
Supremacy Clause, and the Implementadon of Treades, 32 Fordham Intl L J 1209 (2009). Parry argues
that although the history of the interpretation of the Supremacy Clause in the US Constitution
indicates a dominant view that international treaties are self-executing, he also points to the recent
Supreme Court decision Medelkn v Texas, 552 US 491 (2008), in which the Court "came very close
to establishing a presumption against self-execution." Parry, 107 Colum L Rev at 1211.
Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 68 L & Contemp Prob at 42 (cited in note 5). In the case of UK
law, Tomkins notes that "there continue to be large slices of government that judges leave
virtually untouched. Foreign affairs, diplomacy, and military matters, among others, are almost
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exceptions, while perhaps suitable for domestic administrative law, should be
carefully considered before being applied at the global level. This is particularly
the case with a review of development policy and policies relating to
international terrorism. In the case of such policies, the right to life of those at
risk of harm as a result of terrorism is in the balance with the right to life of
those at risk of harm due to the devastating effects of poverty. Moreover, on a
cosmopolitan view of international law, the survival of a state, which is merely a
prudential construct for the furtherance of the equality of individuals and their
pursuit of self-actualization, cannot supersede the protection of the individual,
which is the basic unit of moral and legal consideration.20 3
One might also object that in advocating judicial review of a discretionary
government policy decision with transnational effects, I do not go far enough.
For instance, Grainne de Burca expresses dissatisfaction with judicial checks on
transnational governance because she considers these checks to be an
incomplete form of democratization.2 04 In her view, "a deficiency of democracy
is a core part of the problem of transnational governance and .

.

. despite the

fundamental challenge posed by the very idea of democracy beyond the state,
any serious proposal for addressing the legitimacy of transnational governance
must include a robust democratic aspiration." 205 De Birca argues that a "robust
democratic aspiration" requires that those affected by a decision actually
participate in the decision-making process.206
This critique may be justified if we are addressing participation in formal or
informal non-state transnational institutions. Here, there may well be a
democratic deficit. However, I am addressing the accountability of discretionary
decision-makers who are state officials functioning with the democratic
institutions of that state. The democratic deficit de Burca identifies does not
arise in the case of the decisions of state executives operating within the
parameters of state policymaking. If we are dealing with transnational
organizations in the sense of non-state governing bodies, then democratization
may well require direct participation by those affected, as de Brirca suggests. But
if we instead focus on government policymakers who are making state policy,
then even if this policy is coordinated with other states and thus has a
transnational dimension, its source of legitimacy is still arguably rooted in the

203

never reviewed. On the rare occasions when they are, applications for judicial review are not
successful." Tomkins, The Struggle to Delimit Executive Power in Britain at 46-47 (cited in note 166),
citing Regina v Secretary of Statefor Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Rees-Mgg, [1994] QB
552 (UK).
On the use of the state form as a prudential means of achieving cosmopolitan justice, see Mayeda,

204

47 Can YB Intl L at 37-38 (cited in note 6).
De Burca, 46 Colum J Transnarl L at 117, 129-30 (cited in note 163).
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Id at 132.
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democratic institutions of the state. As a result, there is no crisis of democracy.
What is missing is not democracy, but rather recognition of the equal rights of
those affected by a government policy in a legitimate, democratically made
decision of state officials. It is my view that the cosmopolitan foundation of
international law requires domestic policies with transnational effects to reflect
cosmopolitan norms-that is, they must be other-regarding. The issue I am
addressing is how to introduce these norms into the workings of the democratic
institutions of a state. The method I prefer in this regard is to see domestic
administrative law as porous. Insofar as the purpose of administrative law is to
protect and promote the rule of law, it must enforce the elements of
cosmopolitan right that secure the rule of law for all people across the world.
This conception of international administrative law recognizes that the national
and international levels do not only interact in international or transnational
bodies. Rather, they also interact precisely because domestic administrative law
must take into account cosmopolitan elements of the rule of law by recognizing
the effects of domestic decisions that affect those in distant places.
Finally, it may be objected that it is not realistic to ask domestic courts to
subordinate the interests of their co-nationals to those of the poor in distant
states. In answer to this objection, I would re-state my argument in different
terms. Essentially, I have argued that an international legal regime must of
necessity be a cosmopolitan regime. It is part of the meaning of the rule of law
in such a regime that the interests of all humans be given equal regard. To this
extent, courts that accept that their state and domestic laws operate within a
framework of international law must likewise acknowledge the interests of all
those affected by domestic administrative and policy decisions with
extraterritorial effects. Moreover, chauvinism is going out of style, as statutes
such as the Alien Tort Claims Act,20 7 the UK International Development Act
209
2002,208 and the Canadian Official Development Assistance Accountability Act
demonstrate. Indeed, the increasing popularity of voluntary corporate social
responsibility codes is an indication that even private actors acknowledge that
their own self-interest is an inadequate guide for ethical behavior.
4. Summary of Section II.
In Section II, I have argued that the GAL paradigm as currently promoted
provides limited resources for justifying the review of the discretionary decisions
of government officials to integrate development and security policy. While
there are some indications that GAL scholars acknowledge that the acts of
administrative agencies that violate international law should be sanctioned, this
sanction does not extend to the discretionary decisions of policymakers.
207

28 USC § 1350.

208 2002, c 1.
209 SC 2008, c 17.
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Moreover, GAL tends to limit the normative content of administrative law
review to procedural norms, thus making it difficult to review the content of a
policy. In my view, international administrative law should have more extensive
application and greater normative content.
Historically, Stein and Neumeyer recognized that international
administrative law must deal with those aspects of domestic law that reflect our
life as a global community. Indeed, it is the crystallization of this communal life.
It follows from this broad conception of international administrative law that it
must place limits on the administrative decisions of domestic policymakers if
their decisions affect the fundamental rights of those in other states.
This intrusion into the domestic law of states is justified in principle by the
cosmopolitan norms that form the basis of international law. We are all equal in
our humanity, and we all have a right to pursue the goals that we have reason to
set and that are consistent with others' pursuit of their goals. It follows from this
that the conditions for self-actualization must be secured by law. As a practical
matter, this requires that individuals affected by the integration of development
and security policy be consulted about this integrationist policy and the
programs that purport to implement it. It requires that decisions taken by
policymakers be transparent, and that accountability mechanisms are put in place
to enable those affected by the policies to seek redress for their negative effects.
Part of the expectation of transparency and accountability requires that
policymakers have a rational and reasonable justification for their policy that
appropriately balances competing norms. Moreover, these reasons must comply
with the norms of international human rights law and be consistent with the
equality of all individuals. These restrictions on policy-makers demonstrate both
the procedural and substantive aspects of international administrative law
properly conceived.
III. CONCLUSION
It has long been a strategy of states to prioritize their own survival over the
global good. The use of development assistance as a means of ensuring the
security of the state and its citizens in the face of international terrorism is
merely a modern instance of this strategy. However, from the point of view of
cosmopolitan justice, such a subordination of the ends of the global poor to the
ends of the rich is not only morally but also legally unjustifiable. To the degree
that international law in a globalized world must necessarily pursue
cosmopolitan ends, mechanisms must exist in international law for holding
states accountable for their self-interested decisions that, while they might
promote the interests of their own citizens, derogate from the equally valid
interests of those in developing countries.
This conception of an international cosmopolitan legal order requires
effective legal means for restricting decisions that occur within a "global
administrative space"-a space in which states, either formally or informally,
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cooperatively create and implement coordinated policies that directly affect the
human rights of individuals and their capacity for self-actualization. International
administrative law can be such a means. The Global Administrative Law
movement has traditionally overlooked the role of administrative law in
reviewing discretionary policy decisions of the executives of sovereign states.
However, administrative law is more than just a tool for protecting procedural
fairness in the decision-making of regulators and administrative tribunals.
Rather, it is also a means for enforcing the rule of law and its associated norms.
International administrative law must thus be expanded to allow for the review
of discretionary government decisions that affect fundamental rights protected
at the international level. These rights include the right to equality-understood
as a right to an equal opportunity for self-actualization-that underlies a
cosmopolitan conception of international law.
The evidence of the harm caused by the conflation of development and
security is becoming clearer as social scientists study its effects. Moreover, such
conflation is troubling from both a moral and a political point of view. Morally,
the subordination of the interests of the poor to those of the rich is unjustifiable
except based on a highly partial moral account that gives priority to our
obligations to fellow citizens over obligations to those in distant places.
Politically, the subsuming of development within the rubric of security
reproduces forms of subordination along lines of race and religion that are
unacceptable. Moreover, it shifts our perception of civil society from a positive
source of self-actualization to a place of suspicion, as civil society groups, both
domestically and abroad, come under increased scrutiny as potential
collaborators in international terrorism. These harms justify finding a legal
means of opposing government conflation of security and development policy.
The review of such decisions in the national courts of both donor and recipient
states in accordance with norms of cosmopolitanism and basic human rights will
be a welcome remedy to the nefarious effects of current policy.
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